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CONSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION: A CONSIDERATION OF 
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
RICHARD BOLDT & DAN FRIEDMAN 
ABSTRACT 
 When constitutional courts are called upon to construe general-
ly phrased provisions in the federal or a state’s constitution, they 
necessarily exercise interpretive agency.  This judicial agency is 
thought by some to be in tension with the values of democratic 
governance.  One strategy for dealing with this perceived prob-
lem is to institute a preference for incorporating prior judicial in-
terpretations as a way of reducing the overall incidence of new 
judicial decisionmaking.  This strategy was pressed particularly 
in the mid-twentieth century by Justice Hugo Black, who called 
on the U.S. Supreme Court to incorporate the Court’s prior in-
terpretation of the Bill of Rights as a means of interpreting Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 In instances in which a state supreme court is asked to construe 
a state constitutional provision that is analogous to a parallel 
federal constitutional provision, some have urged the state court 
to systematically defer to the prior interpretation of the parallel 
federal provision by the U.S. Supreme Court.  This position, 
styled the “lockstep” approach, involves a kind of incorporation 
of a prior judicial interpretation, as do both the selective and to-
tal incorporation approaches to interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 This Article reviews the competing conceptions of the judicial 
role and function articulated in the context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporation cases, and evaluates the background 
assumptions and broader calculations that energized that debate 
both on the Court and among mid-twentieth century constitution-
al law scholars.  It then traces the somewhat parallel debate that 
has taken place over the past several decades among state su-
preme court Justices and academics interested in state constitu-
tional interpretation.  The Article concludes by explaining why a 
passive spectator’s role for constitutional courts, which is as-
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sumed by arguments for incorporation in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment context and for a rule requiring automatic or presumptive 
deference by state courts to the prior judicial interpretation of 
parallel provisions in the federal constitution by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, is both undesirable in our democratic system and 
unrealistic.  The Connecticut Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
State v. Santiago is offered instead as an example of how a state 
court should proceed with appropriate agency in interpreting 
state constitutional text. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The practice of constitutional judicial review raises both interpretive 
and institutional questions.  Interpretive questions go to methodology, ex-
ploring the ways in which decisionmakers either construct or discover con-
stitutional meaning.  Institutional questions focus on the proper role of 
courts in interpreting a constitution, and seek to locate judicial deci-
sionmakers within the larger context of democratic government.  Within 
constitutional theory, these two lines of inquiry intersect.  One’s views 
about who should decide constitutional meaning logically influence an un-
derstanding of how the interpretive process should be undertaken.  So too, a 
commitment to a particular interpretive approach implies a related set of 
ideas about what role judicial decisionmakers should have vis-à-vis other 
government actors. 
A prominent theme within the institutional debate, at least since the 
court-packing controversy,1 has been the notion that judicial review is, to 
                                                          
 1.  In the years leading up to Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in 1936, a conserva-
tive majority on the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions resisting legislative and executive 
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use Alexander Bickel’s famous phrase, “a deviant institution in the Ameri-
can democracy.”2  Concerns over the legitimacy of judicial review are said 
to derive from the “counter-majoritarian” nature of the practice, at least in 
those cases in which the policy commitments of the elected branches are 
limited or undermined by a judicial decision that they conflict with the 
Constitution.3  Embedded within this concern over the legitimacy of judicial 
review is a related controversy over whether constitutional legal analysis is 
or can be made distinct from ordinary political decisionmaking.4  Thus, to 
the extent that courts exercising the power of judicial review do so pursuant 
to formal objective legal principles that are independent from the judges’ 
own personal policy preferences and value judgments, the problems of ille-
gitimacy are thought to be ameliorated.5 
Within the realm of state constitutional law, both the interpretive and 
institutional dimensions of constitutional theory have received considerably 
less attention than they have within federal constitutional law scholarship 
and case law.  One topic within state constitutional law, however, has stim-
ulated significant thinking about these questions generally and about the le-
                                                          
branch efforts to intervene in the market for goods and labor.  Following the 1936 election, Roo-
sevelt sought to leverage his political victory by calling on his majority coalition in Congress to 
reorganize the judicial branch through the appointment of additional judges to the federal courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court.  While this “court-packing plan” was not enacted, the Court’s 
approach became much less oppositional to the Administration’s agenda and a number of the most 
resistant Justices resigned.  In the era following these events, the dominant narrative was that the 
Court had engaged in judicial activism, which led to the President’s heavy-handed response and 
severely undermined the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court.  For a good overview of 
these events, see generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
“Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1966).  
 2.  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1986).  One can trace this theme back even further to James Bradley 
Thayer.  See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 130 (1893). 
 3.  See BICKEL, supra note 2.  This conclusion, of course, depends upon according majori-
tarianism a position of primary importance in the hierarchy of constitutional values.  Some consti-
tutional theorists, such as Rebecca Brown, have challenged that premise and by extension the very 
notion that judicial review is inherently suspect.  See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, 
and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998).  
 4.  Justice Black addressed this concern explicitly in his concurrence in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana.  391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (“Thus due process, according to my 
Brother Harlan, is to be a phrase with no permanent meaning, but one which is found to shift from 
time to time in accordance with judges’ predilections and understandings of what is best for the 
country.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Con-
stitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 70 (1988) (“[T]he doctrine of precedent re-
duces the potential politicization of the Court.  It moderates ideological swings and thus preserves 
both the appearance and the reality of the Court as a legal rather than a purely political institu-
tion.”). 
 312 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:309 
gitimacy of judicial decisionmaking more particularly.6  That topic involves 
the interpretation of state constitutional provisions that are identical to or 
nearly alike provisions in the U.S. Constitution.  In instances in which a 
state supreme court is asked to construe a state constitutional provision that 
is either analogous to a parallel federal constitutional provision or that is 
said to include a constitutional principle that has a close federal analog, the 
institutional question arises regarding whether the state court should defer 
to a prior interpretation of the parallel federal provision by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.7  Interpretive questions are also presented in these cases, at 
least to the extent that historical, textual, structural, or other interpretive 
strategies offer the state court an opportunity to draw conclusions that di-
verge from those reached by the prior federal interpretation.8 
It is fundamental that the federal constitution, as interpreted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, provides a uniform floor throughout the United States 
for the recognition of those individual rights that have been incorporated 
through Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.9  This Article takes up 
the problem of whether state supreme courts should, on occasion, construe 
analogous state constitutional provisions as providing rights beyond those 
recognized in federal constitutional law and, if so, how the possibility of 
that excess legal protection should be evaluated in constitutional litigation 
undertaken in state courts.10  One position, which some writers have styled 
the “lockstep” approach, would require a state supreme court to defer en-
tirely to the prior interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to 
an analogous federal constitutional provision.11  The lockstep approach 
                                                          
 6.  See generally Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Meth-
odology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997). 
 7.  See infra text accompanying notes 10–15. 
 8.  For a general discussion of these issues, see G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 173–209 (1998). 
 9.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (stating that “there is an important 
need for uniformity in federal law” which goes “unsatisfied” when the Court fails to review a state 
court decision that “rests primarily upon federal grounds”). 
 10.  Former Justice Ellen Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court offers one approach: “the 
question of state-federal constitutional overlap” can be subdivided into three “component” ques-
tions.  Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 583, 587 (1986).  The first is whether the federal judicial construction of a federal 
constitutional provision either may or must be binding on a state court’s interpretation of its con-
stitution.  Id.  The second is whether a state court can require parties to “exhaust” all possible state 
law remedies, including state constitutional law theories, before resorting to federal constitutional 
claims of right.  Id.  The third is whether a federal court interpretation of federal constitutional law 
is ever relevant to a state court’s construction of its own state constitution.  Id. at 587–88. 
 11.  See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1147 (1993); Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (1988) [hereinafter Maltz, Lockstep]; Earl M. Maltz, The Dark 
Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 996 (1985) [hereinafter Maltz, The Dark Side]; 
cf., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor—Judicial Review 
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would, in effect, incorporate federal constitutional law and make it function 
as state constitutional law as well.12 
A second approach, which has come to be associated most directly 
with Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, would require a 
state supreme court to address fully all state law issues fairly raised in liti-
gation, including both constitutional and non-constitutional rights claims, 
before turning to federal constitutional law.13  This “first things first” ap-
proach derives from the premise that the federal constitutional floor that ap-
plies to the states only comes into play after a state, including its state judi-
cial actors, has acted, and that final judicial action cannot be said to have 
occurred until the state court has considered state law claims.14  An inter-
mediate approach is also possible; specifically, a method which presumes 
state court deference to federal constitutional standards unless one or more 
criteria are established permitting the state court to interpret its state consti-
tutional provision as being at odds with a U.S. Supreme Court interpretation 
of a coordinate federal individual rights provision.15 
                                                          
Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 975, 975–76 (1979); see also Kahn v. 
Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005); Rachel E. Fugate, The Florida Constitution: Still 
Champion of Citizens’ Rights?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 87, 100–01 (1997); James A. Gardner, The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 823–32 (1992) [hereinafter 
Gardner, The Failed Discourse]; James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to 
National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1054–64 
(2003) [hereinafter Gardner, State Constitutional Rights]; Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are 
Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 928–43 
(1993); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274 
(1992); Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. 
REV. 199, 207–08 (1998).  
 12.  See TARR, supra note 8, at 180–82. 
 13.  See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, U. 
BALT. L. REV. 379, 392–96 (1980); see also Caesar v. Campbell, 336 P.3d 775, 778 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2014); State v. Horwitz, No. SC15-348, 2016 WL 2586307, at *8 (Fla. May 5, 2016); State 
v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 28 (Me. 2009) (Silver, J., concurring); State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 41 
(N.H. 2013); R Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. 1994); State v. Poole, 232 
P.3d 519, 523 (Utah 2010); State v. Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (Wash. 2014); RANDY HOLLAND ET 
AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE 151 (2016); Rex Armstrong, State 
Court Federalism, 30 VAL. L. REV. 493, 493–95 (1996); John W. Shaw, Principled Interpreta-
tions of State Constitutional Law—Why Don’t the ‘Primacy’ States Practice What They Preach?, 
54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1993); Van Cleave, supra note 11, at 215. 
 14.  Linde, supra note 13.  
 15.  See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232–34 (Conn. 1992), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145 (Conn. 2003); Doe v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 88 
A.3d 654, 662–63 (Del. 2014); Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961–63 (Fla. 1992); State v. 
Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501, 504–06 (Idaho 1992) (Bistline, J., concurring); People v. Fitzpatrick, 960 
N.E.2d 709, 713–14 (Ill. 2011); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984); People v. Catania, 
398 N.W.2d 343, 351 n.12 (Mich. 1986); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005); 
State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650–51 (N.J. 1983); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 962–67 (N.J. 
1982) (Handler, J., concurring); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 389 (N.C. 2002); State v. 
Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991); 
State v. Schwartz, 689 N.W.2d 430, 440 (S.D. 2004); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 733–34 
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For the most part, the arguments in favor either of a lockstep approach 
or an approach that places a strong presumption on the side of following 
federal constitutional precedent are prudential.  Some have urged state 
courts to adopt parallel federal constitutional interpretations to promote uni-
formity, to simplify the implementation of legal requirements by law en-
forcement officials and others, and to minimize litigation costs and legal 
uncertainty.16  Others have argued that because federal constitutional law is 
more mature than most state constitutional law, and because U.S. Supreme 
Court constitutional jurisprudence is more evolved and nuanced than the 
case law developed by individual state supreme courts, a rule of deference 
ordinarily is best.17  More abstract arguments about the nature of federalism 
and the need for local variation in constitutional standards have been of-
fered both for and against the most deferential approach.18  But perhaps the 
most energetically argued grounds offered in favor of the interpretation of 
state constitutional provisions in lockstep with their analogous federal coun-
terparts relate to concerns about the legitimacy of the judicial function itself 
and the exercise of judicial review.19 
When a state supreme court’s interpretation of its state constitution de-
parts from the position adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court on an identical 
or substantially similar provision in federal constitutional law, the diver-
gence makes possible an argument that the state judges have effectuated 
their personal preference instead of implementing neutral principles in 
reaching their decision.20  When the provision subject to judicial construc-
tion is abstract or general—for example, a guarantee of due process or equal 
protection, or a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment—the de-
cision of the state supreme court to depart from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
position is even more suspect on these grounds.  In these terms, advocates 
                                                          
(Tenn. 1997); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811–13 (Wash. 1986); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 
604, 622 (Wyo. 1993). 
 16.  See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005); People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 
823, 825, 826 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974); State v. Arias, 752 
N.W.2d 748, 755 (Wis. 2008); TARR, supra note 8, at 181; Gardner, State Constitutional Rights, 
supra note 11; Gardner, The Failed Discourse, supra note 11. 
 17.  See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997) (quoting Developments in the Law—The 
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1357 (1982)) (“[W]hen fed-
eral protections are extensive and well-articulated, state court decisionmaking that eschews con-
sideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine not only will often be an inefficient route to an inevi-
table result, but also will lack the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could 
provide . . . .”); see also Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1511–12 (1990). 
 18.  See TARR, supra note 8, at 180–84; see also infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 841, 853 & n.55 (1991) (discussing scholarship on the legitimacy issue).  
 20.  As Alan Tarr puts it: “When two sets of interpreters reach the same outcome in a consti-
tutional case, this increases confidence that the result is rooted in law rather than in will.”  TARR, 
supra note 8, at 175. 
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of the lockstep approach argue that state court deference to federal constitu-
tional understandings operates as a kind of judicial restraint, and therefore 
as a hedge against judicial overreach.21 
A good point of reference for thinking about the legitimacy conse-
quences of deferring (or failing to defer) to a prior judicial interpretation de-
rives from the efforts to constrain the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by incorporating some or all of the 
first eight amendments and the case law decided pursuant to those provi-
sions against the states.22  In effect, the lockstep approach to state constitu-
tional law interpretation involves a kind of incorporation of a prior judicial 
interpretation, as do both the selective and total incorporation approaches to 
interpreting Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.23  Although con-
siderable scholarship has been developed on the question of the interpreta-
tion of parallel state and federal constitutional provisions,24 it has not ana-
lyzed the embedded issue of judicial legitimacy by comparing the 
arguments for a lockstep approach to state constitutional interpretation with 
the arguments offered by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (and by feder-
al constitutional scholars off the bench) for and against the use of incorpora-
tion in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and 
Privileges or Immunities clauses.  The elaborate judicial conversation in the 
incorporation cases between Justice Black on one side and Justices Harlan 
and Frankfurter on the other, particularly with respect to the value of com-
mon law judicial decisionmaking in a constitutional democracy,25 can shed 
significant light on the question of lockstep interpretation of state constitu-
tional provisions. 
Part One of this Article reviews the competing conceptions of judicial 
role and judicial function articulated by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases, and eval-
uates the background assumptions and broader calculations that energized 
                                                          
 21.  See id. 
 22.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162–71 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 23.  See generally Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 
YALE L.J. 74 (1963) (describing and examining the foundations of the selective incorporation doc-
trine and contrasting it with the total incorporation approach).  Some critics of the lockstep ap-
proach to state constitutional interpretation, recognizing that it functions as a form of incorpora-
tion, argue that “[i]t is beyond the state judicial power to incorporate the federal Constitution and 
its future interpretations into the state constitution” because “it is not within the state judicial au-
thority to receive, wholesale, the law of a different sovereign as a part of its domestic law to be 
applied in the future.”  ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 225 
(2009) (citing Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1005 (Alaska 2008)).  Professor Lawrence Sager refers 
to this as “prospective incorporation.”  Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  
 24.  See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 23. 
 25.  See Paul A. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 UCLA L. REV. 467, 
467–69 (1967); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudica-
tion—A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 324–26 (1957). 
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that debate both on the Court and among mid-twentieth century constitu-
tional law scholars.26  Part Two traces the somewhat parallel debate that has 
taken place over the past several decades among state supreme court justic-
es and academics interested in state constitutional interpretation.27  Part 
Three concludes by explaining why a passive spectator’s role for constitu-
tional courts, which is assumed by arguments for incorporation in the Four-
teenth Amendment context and for a rule requiring automatic or presump-
tive deference by state courts to the prior judicial interpretation of parallel 
provisions in the federal constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court, is both 
undesirable in our democratic system and unrealistic.  The Connecticut Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in State v. Santiago28 is offered instead as an 
example of how a state court should proceed with appropriate agency in in-
terpreting state constitutional text.29 
I.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE INCORPORATION DOCTRINE 
In Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,30 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights do not apply directly to 
individual claims against a state or its political subdivisions.31  Barron was 
decided in 1833, well before the Civil War and the subsequent ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.32  This later amendment, of course, 
expressly applies to the states.  The rights-granting provisions in Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, are cast in general terms that 
call on the Court’s interpretive function.  The precise meanings of the 
phrases “privileges or immunities,” “due process of law,” and “equal pro-
tection of the laws” are not self-evident or particularly obvious, and consid-
erable pressure was placed on the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection clauses after the Court’s majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases33 rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause a largely inef-
fective instrument for regulating the states’ exercise of their police pow-
ers.34 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing throughout the 
twentieth century, the Court struggled to find a methodology upon which 
the Justices could agree for interpreting the broad language of the Four-
                                                          
 26.  See infra Part II.  
 27.  See infra Part III.  
 28.  122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015). 
 29.  See infra Part IV.  
 30.  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 31.  Id. at 247–51.  
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 33.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 34.  See id. at 80 (noting that the rights claimed by the plaintiffs in error “are not privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the . . . fourteenth amend-
ment”). 
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teenth Amendment’s rights guarantees, especially the Due Process Clause.  
In Davidson v. New Orleans35 in 1877, the Court held that the meaning of 
due process must be determined by a “gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion,” of individual cases as they come up for review.36  Sixty 
years later, in Palko v. Connecticut,37 Justice Cardozo famously observed 
that this incremental process had yielded a “line of division [that] may seem 
to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty catalogue of the cases on the 
one side and the other.”38  But, he concluded, “Reflection and analysis will 
induce a different view.  There emerges the perception of a rationalizing 
principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence.”39 
Justice Cardozo and his colleagues on the Court sought to capture this 
rationalizing principle through a variety of related formulations, including 
whether a challenged state practice was consistent with “the very essence of 
a scheme of ordered liberty,” whether the state’s approach violated “a prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked as fundamental,” and whether “a fair and enlightened system of 
justice” could operate without the claimed constitutional protection.40  Not-
withstanding Cardozo’s brave optimism that a coherent doctrine could be 
articulated, from the Palko case in 1937 until the Court’s decision in Ad-
amson v. California41 in 1947, these various formulations yielded a body of 
due process case law that described anything but a clear line of demarcation 
between acceptable and unacceptable state practices.42 
While some Justices remained content with this traditional, common 
law-informed approach to due process analysis, the lingering legacy of the 
Lochner era and the challenge of FDR’s court-packing plan caused others to 
question whether the Court could manage a consistent doctrinal approach 
that would adequately cabin the subjective personal preferences of the Jus-
tices.43  The crisis of legitimacy occasioned by Lochner v. New York44 trig-
gered a variety of reactions.45  As Paul Freund put it, “[d]ifferent minds, re-
                                                          
 35.  96 U.S. 97 (1877). 
 36.  Id. at 104.  
 37.  302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 38.  Id. at 325.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
 41.  332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
 42.  See Kadish, supra note 25, at 319–20 (discussing and comparing due process cases, in-
cluding Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)). 
 43.  Justices Black and Douglas were the most explicit critics of the ordered liberty approach, 
as evidenced by Justice Black’s extended dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting), which Justice Douglas joined. 
 44.  198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 45.  Lochner has come to symbolize the body of Supreme Court cases from the early twenti-
eth century in which a conservative activist Court was seen to interfere with democratic innova-
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pelled alike by the excesses of the Court, nevertheless responded in differ-
ent ways.”46  Some adopted the stance that became crystallized in footnote 
four of the Carolene Products case,47 according to which the deference the 
court owed the policy judgments of elected officials when exercising the 
power of judicial review turned on an assessment of majoritarian process 
and the fundamentality of the rights at stake.48  Others, notably including 
Justice Hugo Black, turned to text and history in an effort to fix limits on 
the Court’s reviewing function.  For Black, “the lesson was that the judges 
lose the way when they put glosses on the Constitution, that they are safe, 
and the people secure, only when they follow the mandates of the Framers 
in their full and natural meaning.”49  Black believed that the incremental 
“ordered liberty” analysis of the traditional due process approach was an 
extra-constitutional gloss that provided little guidance to the Court, instead 
serving as an excuse for the Justices to impose their own views regarding 
the proper balance to be struck between the needs of state and local gov-
ernments on the one side and the protections of individual liberty on the 
other.50 
Justice Black argued that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should conform to the intention of its framers and ratifiers, and asserted that 
the historical evidence from the Amendment’s promulgation process sup-
ported total or “complete incorporation.”51  This theory had both a rights 
expanding and a rights limiting quality.52  Black’s position was that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with the other 
clauses of the Amendment,53 were meant to impose upon the states all of 
                                                          
tion at the state and federal level.  For a discussion of the reactions to Lochner among “New Deal-
ers,” see Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitu-
tional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 512 (2000).  See also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 9 (3d ed. 2007). 
 46.  Freund, supra note 25, at 467. 
 47.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 48.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 73–77 (1980). 
 49.  Freund, supra note 25, at 467. 
 50.  In Adamson, Justice Black declared: 
I further contend that the “natural law” formula which the Court uses to reach its con-
clusion in this case should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Consti-
tution.  I believe that formula to be itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly 
conveys to courts, at the expense of legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in 
fields where no specific provision of the Constitution limits legislative power. 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 51.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 165, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 52.  Freund, supra note 25, at 469. 
 53.  Justice Black’s views evolved over time from an initial interest in reading substantive 
rights into the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a later preference for reading the various provi-
sions of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment together as importing the protections of the 
Bill of Rights.  See Comment, The Adamson Case: A Study in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALE 
L.J. 268, 271 (1949) [hereinafter The Adamson Case] (recounting Justice Black’s shift from his 
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the specific obligations that the federal government had under the Bill of 
Rights.54  He argued first that this was the purpose of the Amendment’s 
sponsors and the understanding of the public at the time of ratification.  
Black also asserted that total incorporation, thus understood, would limit 
the range of judicial decisionmaking by putting into place as governing 
precedent in claims against states under the Fourteenth Amendment previ-
ously decided cases interpreting the first eight amendments in the context of 
claims against the federal government.55 
That Justice Black’s theory of total incorporation had the potential to 
expand the range of rights recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment 
relative to the set of rights protected by way of the traditional ordered liber-
ty approach can be seen in cases like Adamson.  Black, in dissent, took is-
sue with the majority’s view that a California law permitting a prosecutor to 
comment on a criminal defendant’s failure to take the stand did not violate 
the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.56  But, per-
haps more important to Black, the total incorporation approach also had the 
potential to limit significantly the Court’s discretion in interpreting the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to limit the range of 
rights that might be recognized under that clause.57  This limiting quality 
was also apparent in Adamson, particularly in the separate dissent by Justic-
es Murphy and Rutledge, which departed from Justice Black’s approach by 
arguing that the inclusion of rights by way of the incorporation doctrine 
should not limit the recognition of other rights in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment beyond those set out in the Bill of Rights.58  This “incorporation plus” 
approach clearly was inconsistent with Justice Black’s theory precisely be-
cause it accorded the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
dependent constitutional significance, thus permitting the Court to recog-
nize constitutional protections not specified in the first eight amendments or 
recognized by the Court’s Bill of Rights precedents.59  Black, by contrast, 
                                                          
views in Hague v. CIO, where he argued the privileges or immunities clause was a source of 
rights, to his views expressed in Duncan v. Louisiana, where he argued that all of the provisions 
within Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read together to incorporate the Bill 
of Rights).  
 54.  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–72. 
 55.  See Freund, supra note 25, at 467–69.  
 56.  See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71. 
 57.  See Freund, supra note 25, at 469, 472. 
 58.  Justice Murphy explained: “I agree [with Justice Black] that the specific guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. 
Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards 
of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite 
the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights.”  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). 
 59.  Freund, supra note 25, at 469 (“As far back as Adamson v. California, Justice Black 
made it clear that the Bill of Rights sets limits as well as horizons for him, while others on the 
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argued that “none of the separate clauses [of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] can have any independent meaning, for the section must be 
read as a whole to bring the Bill of Rights—and nothing more—to bear up-
on the states.”60  The Court’s function, explained Black, was not to interpret 
the words “due process of law” in the context of specific disputes, but in-
stead to cut-and-paste an already established body of judicial precedent into 
the space created by the Fourteenth Amendment to avoid the corrupting po-
tential of any additional case-specific constitutional adjudication. 
Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Adamson and his later concur-
rence in Duncan v. Louisiana61 pressed the case for total incorporation on 
two separate grounds.  The first was an original intention argument based 
on historical evidence; the second was an argument premised on the Jus-
tice’s views respecting the properly limited role of the Court in a constitu-
tional democracy.  As noted in his dissent and in the elaborate appendix of 
historical materials he attached to his Adamson opinion,62 Justice Black’s 
position was that the meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be derived not from background principles or broad conceptions of 
“natural law,” but rather from the clear intent of those associated with its 
formulation and adoption, most notably Congressman John Bingham of 
Ohio.63  This strategy of nailing down the interpretive scope of the amend-
ment by linking it to a particular historical narrative, however, had several 
inherent weaknesses.  First, as pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in his re-
sponse to Justice Black in Adamson, the “[r]emarks of a particular propo-
nent of the Amendment, no matter how influential, are not to be deemed 
part of the Amendment.  What was submitted for ratification was his pro-
posal, not his speech.”64  More broadly, Justice Black’s historical case for 
total incorporation turned on his willingness to generalize the intentions of 
one key actor and assign them to a diverse group of government officials 
and other supporters of the amendment whose purposes may not have 
                                                          
Court were unwilling to make this commitment and chose to regard the Bill of Rights as furnish-
ing a minimal, not a preemptive, content to the fourteenth amendment.”). 
 60.  The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 271. 
 61.  391 U.S. 145, 179–81 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 62.  See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 63.  See The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 273.  Justice Black’s historical argument, 
which is set out in detail in his Appendix in the Adamson case, relies heavily on public statements 
about the intended purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment that were made by John Bingham and 
Roscoe Conkling, two of the principle drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, in support of the 
total incorporation view.  Id.  Historians who favor this position rely especially on a speech by 
Bingham in 1871 that linked his criticism of Barron v. Baltimore with the privileges or immuni-
ties clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, LECTURES ON THE 
FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1898); 
Louis B. Boudin, Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 19, 22 
n.5 (1938).  
 64.  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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aligned with Bingham’s.65  Finally, there is considerable evidence from the 
historical record that even Congressman Bingham’s intentions may have 
been more complex than Justice Black allowed.66  
The second ground offered by Justice Black in support of total incor-
poration was equally problematic.  Mindful of the Court’s excesses in the 
Lochner era, Black cautioned that the due process “formula also has been 
used in the past, and can be used in the future, to license this Court, in con-
sidering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the broad expanses of 
policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain 
of the States as well as the Federal Government.”67  To avoid the inevitable 
temptation of judicial policymaking presented by the vagueness of the or-
dered liberty formulation, Black urged his colleagues to adopt the fixed ju-
risprudence of total incorporation.68  In so arguing, as Paul Freund pointed 
out, there was “more than a touch of Jeremy Bentham in Justice Black, a 
Bentham with an unmistakably American accent.”69  Bentham’s target had 
been judge-made common law that, in his view, was an “excrescence” sul-
lying the “clean instrument of popular will” represented by properly enacted 
legislation.70  For Black, the enemy was the ordered liberty gloss that the 
                                                          
 65.  Other historians, who have focused on the antislavery origins of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, have developed research suggesting that a number of the proponents of the amendment 
within Congress were motivated primarily by a desire to constitutionalize human rights norms 
generally rather than to lock in specific protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  See, e.g., 
Howard Graham, The Early Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIS. L. 
REV. 479 (1950); see also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW: THE ANTISLAVERY 
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951). 
 66.  See The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 274 (discussing Bingham’s position “as a rail-
road lawyer and a strong proponent of economic laissez-faire, which might have made him sym-
pathetic to the very view of due process which is anathema to Justice Black”).  There has been 
renewed interest among historians in Congressman Bingham in recent years.  For a good overview 
of Bingham’s life both before and during his service in Congress, see GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, 
AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2013).  It is clear from this new biographical information that Bingham’s views 
evolved during his period of service in the House of Representatives.  When he first returned to 
Congress, he aligned himself with moderate Republicans over issues of Reconstruction, and gen-
erally opposed the more extreme demands of the radical Republicans.  Despite his central role in 
developing the language that eventually became Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Bingham did not initially support legislation guaranteeing voting rights for African Americans.  
Id.  Over time, however, as Southern resistance stiffened, Bingham migrated toward the radical 
Republicans’ Reconstruction measures.  Bingham opposed early efforts to impeach President An-
drew Johnson, but he eventually changed his position.  In February of 1868, Bingham voted with 
the majority of Republicans in the House of Representatives to impeach the President, and he was 
subsequently selected to serve on the House Committee of Impeachment Managers that conducted 
the impeachment trial against President Johnson in the Senate.  Id.   
 67.  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 68.  See id. at 89. 
 69.  Freund, supra note 25, at 473. 
 70.  Id.  On Bentham’s critique of the common law, see Dean Alfange Jr., Jeremy Bentham 
and the Codification of the Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 63 (1969).  Alfange notes that Ben-
tham’s adoption of the utility principle led him to the conviction that: 
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Court had developed to give content to the Due Process Clause, or, as he 
saw it, “judge-made law as an encrustation on the Constitution.”71 
By fixing the content of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
that it subsumed neither more nor less than the set of constitutional protec-
tions the Court had found to be guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, Black 
hoped “to minimize the vagrant propensities and biases of the thousands of 
judges, trial and appellate, who, over time, are called on to administer our 
constitutional order.”72  Referring to the flexible due process approach of 
the Adamson majority as “mush,” Black preferred instead to lock in the set-
tled legal understandings the Court had developed in its prior jurisprudence 
interpreting the first eight amendments to the Constitution.73  But the incor-
poration theory’s “limitation to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
[was unlikely to] pin the Amendment down to a precise and certain mean-
ing.”74  In the first place, many of the key provisions within the first eight 
amendments are not particularly concrete or specific, and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of these guarantees, in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments especially, were not “derive[d] from a literal read-
ing,” but rather from the very sort of judicial extrapolation that so unsettled 
Justice Black in the Fourteenth Amendment context.75  Indeed, this method 
of interpretation made it difficult to see how incorporating a flexible body 
of Supreme Court doctrine developed in the past would yield a fixed juris-
prudence moving forward.76 
In addition, of course, the Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process 
Clause of its own.77  By incorporating the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amend-
ment due process jurisprudence into the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not 
                                                          
[L]aws should be drawn up by scientists like himself, who understood the principle of 
utility and who could determine what laws would do most to provide the greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number.  There could be no room for haphazard legal develop-
ment.  Laws drawn up by scientists would be placed in the form of a code, and nothing 
that did not appear in the code would be law.  This would, of course, exclude all judge-
made law, and at this point Bentham’s theory came into direct conflict with the tradi-
tions of the English common law.   
Id.  For a classic statement of Bentham’s position on judge-made law, see J. BENTHAM, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, in I WORKS 1 (Clarendon 
Press 1823) (1789). 
 71.  Freund, supra note 25, at 473. 
 72.  Id. at 472. 
 73.  Justice Black and First Amendment “Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
549, 562 (1962). 
 74.  The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 276. 
 75.  Id.; see, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“evolving standards of decency” under the 
Eighth Amendment); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957) (double jeopardy under the 
Fifth Amendment). 
 76.  See The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 276–77. 
 77.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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at all apparent that Justice Black’s goal to limit judicial discretion would be 
advanced.  As one commentator at the time put it: 
 The Fifth Amendment is equally as capable as the Fourteenth of 
contraction and expansion to suit changing views of judicial poli-
cy.  It would appear that the existence of so elastic a provision in 
the Bill of Rights is conclusively fatal to the theory that limitation 
to it would bring about a new certainty and predictability in the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 
On the other hand, the incorporation approach urged by Justice Black 
did have two related characteristics that could advance the judicial legitima-
cy goals he returned to again and again.  Presumably, if total incorporation 
were adopted by the Court, the overall volume of new judicial decisionmak-
ing by the Justices would be reduced.  For example, instead of deciding 
afresh whether due process required states to provide grand jury indictment 
or a twelve-person jury or the like, the Court could simply apply to the 
states whatever rules already were in place to govern the constitutional 
criminal procedure rights of federal criminal defendants.  To the extent that 
Justice Black’s Benthamite instincts treated the very act of judicial deci-
sionmaking as inherently corrosive of democratic values, the less new case 
law the better.  Moreover, by reducing the possibility that similar or identi-
cal legal claims would be resolved inconsistently by courts considering the 
rights of litigants under the Fourteenth Amendment versus under one of the 
first eight amendments, the adoption of total incorporation presumably 
would reduce the perception that these judicial outcomes were the product 
of individual judges’ personal preferences rather than the result of formal 
legal doctrine being applied by neutral decisionmakers.79  Thus, even if total 
incorporation was unlikely to eradicate the operation of judicial judgment 
by replacing open-ended text with fixed constitutional meaning, it still had 
the potential to bring “a desirable certainty by standardizing Supreme Court 
protection of personal liberties.”80 
The Supreme Court never adopted Justice Black’s total incorporation 
approach.  It did, however, eventually settle on the variant theory of “selec-
                                                          
 78.  The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 277. 
 79.  See Freund, supra note 25, at 472–73.  It is worth noting, however, that this argument, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, could be the basis for rejecting incorporation.  Thus, one could ar-
gue that because the Fifth Amendment contains a due process clause, the identical Due Process 
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be interpreted to include the other specific guaran-
tees contained in other parts of the Bill of Rights, as that reading would render the original Due 
Process Clause surplusage.  This argument was entertained for a period, but was ultimately reject-
ed in Powell v. Alabama.  287 U.S. 45, 66–67 (1932); see also Kadish, supra note 25, at 324. 
 80.  The Adamson Case, supra note 53, at 277.  As Justice Brennan, a chief proponent of se-
lective incorporation, put the point in Cohen v. Hurley: “I cannot follow the logic which applies 
[to the states] a particular specific [of the Bill of Rights] for some purposes and denies its applica-
tion for others.”  366 U.S. 117, 158 (1961). 
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tive incorporation.”81  Four Justices on the Adamson Court endorsed selec-
tive incorporation, and the compromise position commanded a clear majori-
ty by the time Duncan v. Louisiana was decided.82 
To Justice Black, the selective incorporation compromise was an im-
provement over the ordered liberty approach of the earlier due process cas-
es, although he continued to view it as less desirable than total incorpora-
tion.83  In Duncan, he wrote: 
 I believe as strongly as ever that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States.  I 
have been willing to support the selective incorporation doctrine, 
however, as an alternative, although perhaps less historically sup-
portable than complete incorporation.  The selective incorporation 
process, if used properly, does limit the Supreme Court in the 
Fourteenth Amendment field to specific Bill of Rights’ protec-
tions only and keeps judges from roaming at will in their own no-
tions of what policies outside the Bill of Rights are desirable and 
what are not.84 
This argument in favor of selective incorporation, particularly Justice 
Black’s concern for judicial self-restraint, may have contributed to the doc-
trine’s subsequent adoption by the Court’s majority,85 but in the final analy-
sis, selective incorporation likely had a minimal effect in actually restrain-
ing the Court.  It may, however, have advanced other administrability 
objectives related to uniformity and judicial efficiency.86  Prior to the 
Court’s embrace of selective incorporation, the Justices had gradually rec-
ognized certain “substantive” rights against the states that mirrored protec-
tions found in the First and Fifth Amendments and other “procedural” pro-
tections that qualified pursuant to the ordered liberty formulation.87  
Selective incorporation represented a departure from this approach, espe-
cially with respect to procedural rights, because a finding by the Court that 
a provision in the Bill of Rights was incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment meant not only that the right applied generally to the states but 
that it applied “to the same extent and in the same ways as it does to the 
                                                          
 81.  See Henkin, supra note 23, at 74. 
 82.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163–64 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 83.  See Henkin, supra note 23, at 74, 76. 
 84.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171. 
 85.  See Henkin, supra note 23, at 77 (noting that selective incorporation “appears to avoid 
the impression of personal, ad hoc adjudication by every court which attempts to apply the vague 
contents and contours of ‘ordered liberty’ to every different case that comes before it”). 
 86.  See id. (“Similar standards for state and nation . . . would simplify constitutional juris-
prudence, the administration of justice, and cooperation between state and federal agencies.”). 
 87.  See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Henkin, supra note 23, at 81–85. 
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federal government.”88  Justice Harlan, dissenting in Duncan, noted this 
very feature.  He pointed out that, while the Court remained “unwilling to 
accept the total incorporationists’ view,” nevertheless, by adopting selective 
incorporation, it had turned its task from “determining whether denial of 
trial by jury in the situation before us, or in other situations, is fundamental-
ly unfair,” and instead had “simply assumed that the question before us is 
whether the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment should be incorpo-
rated into the Fourteenth, jot-for-jot and case-for-case, or ignored.”89 
The Court’s embrace of selective incorporation achieved, effectively, 
the outcome that Justice Black had sought through total incorporation.  In-
deed, by the early decades of the twenty-first century, virtually all of the 
protections in the Bill of Rights had been incorporated against the states.90  
On the one hand, getting to this result piecemeal had the advantage of 
avoiding the debate over Justice Black’s historical evidence and original in-
tention position that some Justices and academics had vigorously chal-
lenged.91  It also permitted the Court to avoid recognizing several Bill of 
Rights provisions, such as the right to a jury trial in virtually all civil cases, 
which would have imposed enormous costs on the states,92 and to recognize 
                                                          
 88.  Henkin, supra note 23, at 76. 
 89.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 180–81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The selective incorporation of prior 
Bill of Rights doctrine jot-for-jot not only impacted the development of the Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it also imposed a perhaps unintended influence on the prospective de-
velopment of constitutional rights with respect to the federal government.  Id.  Thus, in Williams 
v. Florida, Justice Harlan, again complaining about the all-or-nothing quality of the selective in-
corporation approach, pointed out that its application in that case had diluted the scope of a federal 
jury trial right in order to accommodate its identical application to the states.  399 U.S. 78, 118 
(1970).  Williams involved a challenge to a state law that permitted criminal conviction in noncap-
ital cases by a unanimous jury of six persons.  Id. at 79–80.  Justice Harlan recognized that states 
had good reason to experiment with the size and operation of criminal juries, even if the federal 
government did not.  Id. at 133 (Harlan, J., concurring).  But, he explained, the consequence of the 
Court’s decision with respect to state jury practice was that the “federal guarantee [had been wa-
tered down] in order to reconcile the logic of ‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ 
application of the federal right to the States, with the reality of federalism.”  Id. at 129. 
 90.  See Jonathan D. Varat et al., “Incorporation”—Its Current Scope, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 548–50 (13th ed. 2009).  Among the few exceptions are the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of indictment by grand jury.  See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 
633 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause “does not require the States to observe the Fifth 
Amendment’s provision for presentment or indictment by a grand jury”).  Another exception is the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines.  See generally Browning-Ferris Indus. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).  
 91.  See Justice Harlan’s vigorous disagreement with Justice Black’s historical argument in 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 180–81 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See also Charles 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 
(1949). 
 92.  See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not require juries in civil cases).   
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certain rights not within the original Bill of Rights as required by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.93 
On the other hand, once the analysis shifted from incorporation in its 
entirety to incorporation selectively, proponents were left without a justifi-
cation based on history or original purpose and were faced with significant 
problems of doctrinal uncertainty.  Unlike total incorporation, the adoption 
of selective incorporation still obligated the Court to identify a “principle of 
selection” to determine which rights were incorporated and which were 
not.94  Thus, while the Justices may have avoided phrases like “ordered lib-
erty” and the like, they were still forced to articulate the grounds upon 
which some rights in the Bill of Rights were applied against the states while 
others were left out.95  In this respect, the new regime was more like the tra-
ditional approach to due process analysis than it was like total incorpora-
tion.  As Louis Henkin put the point: “There is no constitutional language, 
no established doctrine, no old case, that can be invoked to avoid the inevi-
table question of ordered liberty.”96 
Prior to the adoption of selective incorporation, the Supreme Court’s 
settled understanding regarding a provision of the Bill of Rights in the fed-
eral context was, perhaps, treated as some evidence of what the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might require of the states.  In this 
sense, the cases interpreting individual rights within the first eight amend-
ments had an “indirect relevance” to the Court’s ordered liberty and funda-
mental fairness calculations under the Fourteenth Amendment, but were not 
themselves mandatory authority.97  The Court’s task in each case was to 
evaluate the requirements of fairness and the obligations inherent in evolv-
ing notions of due process rather than to identify and reapply existing doc-
trine whole cloth.  Not only did the ordered liberty or “natural law” ap-
proach permit the Court to shape Fourteenth Amendment protections 
against the states to be either greater or more restrictive than those it had 
found under the Bill of Rights,98 it also made possible the recognition of 
some rights that had been imposed against the federal government without 
imposing jot-for-jot the corresponding implementing procedures that had 
                                                          
 93.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process protects a 
criminal defendant against conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime”).   
 94.  Henkin, supra note 23, at 82–83. 
 95.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972) (concluding that the Fifth 
Amendment right to indictment by grand jury is not binding in state criminal prosecutions). 
 96.  Henkin, supra note 23, at 83. 
 97.  Id. at 78. 
 98.  Thus, the Court in Adamson held that the state did not violate due process if it permitted 
the prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s failure to take the stand, but at the same time the 
Court did “repeatedly [hold] applicable to the states that part of the privilege not to be compelled 
to testify against oneself which bars the use of coerced confessions.”  Id. at 81. 
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been adopted in that context.99  Moreover, without invoking the language of 
incorporation or absorption, the Court could have adopted any of the federal 
standards that ultimately were identified through selective incorporation 
simply by using the older ordered liberty approach, had it so chosen.100 
Absent the anchoring of historical intention and unambiguous constitu-
tional text, selective incorporation was incapable of eradicating judicial dis-
cretion in the development of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In this sense, the 
doctrine fell well short of Justice Black’s goal of a fixed jurisprudence that 
would leave fundamental questions of public policy to state and federal 
elected officials.101  But selective incorporation did advance Justice Black’s 
agenda by reducing the frequency with which the Court entered into the 
task of constitutional interpretation ab initio.  Thus, rather than encounter-
ing each new claim for a procedural or substantive right by evaluating its 
merits from the ground up, the Court, once it had determined to selectively 
incorporate the asserted right, instead deferred to the prior adjudication of 
the parallel claim under one of the first eight amendments.102  In this sense, 
the adoption of selective incorporation did serve to fix the constitutional 
meaning of due process by leveraging prior case law that it locked in for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, thereby reducing the total volume of new 
adjudications that the Court was obligated to entertain. 
Whether one regards as a good outcome the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by defaulting to 
the work of prior adjudicators depends on one’s assumptions about the rela-
tive costs and advantages of judicial decisionmaking.  The question is 
whether the considerable advantages of a flexible due process jurisprudence 
can be realized without incurring too many of the costs to democratic gov-
ernance associated with such judicial practice.  In contrast to the efforts of 
Justice Black, the first Justice Harlan, and others to develop a fixed due 
process jurisprudence through total incorporation (or a partially-fixed ver-
sion by way of selective incorporation), the alternative tradition of flexible 
                                                          
 99.  For example, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held the Fourth Amendment applicable to 
the states, but concluded that the exclusionary rule was not required in state cases involving war-
rantless and unreasonable searches or seizures.  338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).  By contrast, in Weeks v. 
United States, the Court had held that the exclusionary rule was enforceable in federal courts in 
similar circumstances.  232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 100.  See Henkin, supra note 23, at 82 (“If the federal standard is indeed the goal in some in-
stances, the Court can, without any difficult new doctrine, find the federal standard to be required 
by ordered liberty or by other elements in the Court’s jurisprudence.”).  
 101.  Despite the purported goal of judicial restraint, some commentators have argued that 
Black’s more pressing goal was to lock in the judicial activism of the Warren Court’s civil rights 
jurisprudence while avoiding a return to the economic liberty jurisprudence of the Lochner Court.  
See Kadish, supra note 25, at 336. 
 102.  Id. at 338 (“The consequence of requiring due process to be measured precisely by the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights is not to eliminate broad judicial inquiry, but rather to change its 
focus from due process to freedom of speech or freedom from double jeopardy, and the rest, and 
to disguise its essential character.”).   
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due process that has also been present throughout much of our constitution-
al history has been based on the conviction that judges are capable of navi-
gating the inevitable normative conflicts presented both by procedural and 
substantive rights claims without falling back entirely on subjective person-
al preference.103  This tradition of flexible due process analysis can be 
traced from cases decided shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,104 to Justice Moody’s opinion in Twining v. New Jersey,105 to 
Justice Cardozo’s ordered liberty formulation in Palko.106  The effort was 
maintained by Justice Frankfurter in Adamson107 and the second Justice 
Harlan in Duncan v. Louisiana, and one can discern elements of this tradi-
tion in more recent Supreme Court cases developing the substantive side of 
the Due Process Clause, including the line of privacy decisions starting with 
Griswold v. Connecticut.108  Throughout these cases, proponents on the 
Court of a flexible approach to due process have maintained that such an 
analysis can be accomplished without the Justices essentially becoming or-
dinary political decisionmakers.109  Justice Moody argued that the Court 
need not “import into the discussion our own personal views of what would 
be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be adopted by a free people 
and confound them with constitutional limitations,”110 and Justice Frankfur-
ter explained that the Court’s analysis should “move within the limits of ac-
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 334–35. 
 104.  See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (holding that due process em-
braces “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and polit-
ical institutions”).  These cases, in turn, built on an early nineteenth century decision interpreting 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (explaining that the Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the in-
dividual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established 
principles of private rights and distributive justice”).  
 105.  211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908) (noting that due process effectuates “a fundamental principle of 
liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government, and is the inalienable right 
of a citizen of such a government”). 
 106.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–26 (1937). 
 107.  Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53–54, 65–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 108.  381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the authors of the Joint 
Opinion took just this position: 
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty 
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. . . .  [A]djudication of substantive due pro-
cess claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that 
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. . . .  
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morali-
ty, but that cannot control our decision.  Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code. 
505 U.S. at 848, 849, 850. 
 110.  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 107 (1908). 
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cepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a 
merely personal judgment.”111 
The chief argument for a flexible approach to due process is that the 
constitutional text sets out a “moral command” and is not a “strictly jural 
precept.”112  Operating alongside other guarantees within the Bill of Rights, 
the due process protections available under the Fourteenth Amendment can 
be understood to regulate the exercise of government power in an evolving 
cultural, economic, and technological environment.113  Advances in tech-
nology, communications, and the structure of mediating social institutions 
put pressure on static understandings of constitutional liberty.114  The flexi-
ble approach, by contrast, permits constitutional norms to remain nimble 
and responsive to exigencies that could not have been foreseen when the 
relevant text was developed and ratified.115  As Justice Frankfurter ex-
plained, due process is “a standard for judgment in the progressive evolu-
tion of the institutions of a free society” and is not an immutable set of rules 
to be applied mechanically and without attention to the changing circum-
stances within which constitutional cases arise.116 
Proponents of a flexible approach to due process analysis focus not on-
ly on the need to fit constitutional meaning to an evolving social, cultural, 
political, and economic context, but also on the danger that a static ap-
proach inevitably serves to obscure the exercise of moral judgment that is 
an essential feature of this interpretive task.  They argue that “quests for 
fixed meanings” have “failed to accomplish more than to mask and drive 
from conscious recognition the subtle problems of value choosing inherent 
in due process adjudication”117 and prefer instead to press to the surface and 
                                                          
 111.  Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 112.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 341. 
 113.  Id. (“Thus conceived, in the light of its ultimate relation to the preservation of the condi-
tions of a free society, the residuary procedural guarantee of due process is readily seen to be in-
compatible with changeless meanings.”).  
 114.  Id. (stating that fixing the meaning of due process once and for all binds “[f]uture genera-
tions . . . to the perceptions of an earlier one; the experience that develops with changing modes of 
governmental power, unpredicted and unpredictable at an earlier time, as well as the deeper in-
sights into the nature of man in organized society that are gained in continually changing social 
contexts, would become irrelevant”).  
 115.  In Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice Harlan put the point as follows: “[D]ue process is an 
evolving concept and . . . old principles are subject to re-evaluation in light of later experience.” 
391 U.S. 145, 183 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 116.  Malinski, 324 U.S. at 414.  This argument assumes that the direction of evolution within 
free societies is always progressive.  By contrast, some, most prominently Justice Scalia, have 
taken the position that social evolution can just as easily be regressive, and thus that fixing consti-
tutional liberties to their intended meanings at the founding is a better approach than other meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation.  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. 
CINN. L. REV. 849, 852–55 (1989). 
 117.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 344. 
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then regulate the normative work that judges are called upon to perform 
when questions of constitutional fairness are raised.118 
Mindful of this need to regulate the process by which values choices 
are made, so as to avoid the delegitimizing dynamics of plainly subjective 
policymaking, some have argued that the properly limited judicial role 
within a flexible system is to “passively apply[] moral judgments already 
made.”119  One source of established moral judgment to which judicial deci-
sionmakers could defer is community consensus.  But determining what the 
community’s normative commitments are, and whether they are stable or 
merely the transitory result of a passing crisis, is a task potentially beyond 
the institutional competence of judicial actors.120  The Court might consult 
public opinion polls or seek other objective measures of the community’s 
preferences, although the difficulties of such a strategy seem apparent.121  
Or, the Court could apply moral judgments already made by particular rec-
ognized entities such as Congress or the relevant state legislatures, on the 
premise that moral judgment ought to be assigned to democratically respon-
sive institutions.122  Unfortunately, this approach “escapes rather than meets 
the problem” because it drains constitutional limits on democratic deci-
sionmaking of “any independent integrity as a governing normative princi-
ple.”123 
Of course, a constitutional court can choose to defer to the moral deci-
sionmaking of other courts, whether those of predecessor judges on the 
same court or other courts entirely.  When the Justices on the Supreme 
Court accord significant precedential authority to prior decisions of that 
Court within a system of stare decisis, they are in effect adopting the em-
                                                          
 118.  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2–17 (1996); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 
147–51 (1988).  Justice Stevens makes a similar point in his dissenting opinion in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, where he argues that “a rigid historical methodology . . .  promises an objectivity 
it cannot deliver and masks the value judgments that pervade any analysis of what customs, de-
fined in what manner, are sufficiently ‘rooted’” to count as protected liberty interests within the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  561 U.S. 742, 875–76 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 119.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 344.  Of course, even the most subjective judgments made by 
courts in the course of constitutional adjudication are distinguishable from legislative policymak-
ing in that judicial decisions necessarily are after-the-fact determinations based on a discrete set of 
facts. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See id.  There has been intense debate on the Court in the Eighth Amendment area over 
whether to rely on “evolving standards of decency” and, if so, how to ascertain them.  See, e.g., 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005). 
 122.  See Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11, at 975–77. 
 123.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 345.  It also falls short because it fails to restrain the “undisci-
plined factors of taste and undemonstrable preference” that can drive the decisionmaking of elect-
ed officials and potentially “exclude[s] any resort to reason and scientific method.”  Id. 
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bedded value choices that animated those prior decisions.124  And when 
judges weigh the decisions of other courts as persuasive authority,125 they 
also may borrow those courts’ judgments with respect to the normative is-
sues at stake.  In this respect, the common law tradition may have a con-
straining effect on constitutional adjudication by channeling the exercise of 
discretion within established paths and ensuring that new commitments or-
dinarily are consistent with the warp and weave of the constitutional fabric 
already in place.126 
Deference to moral judgments contained within prior court decisions 
through a process of common law analogic reasoning can have a constrain-
ing effect on the exercise of discretion associated with the interpretation of 
open constitutional text such as the Due Process Clause.  Such an approach, 
however, is still discretionary and flexible in comparison to the more me-
chanical effort to fix constitutional meaning by incorporating prior doctrine 
jot-for-jot, as selective incorporation seeks to do.  This fundamental choice 
between a system of case-by-case judicial discretion operating within the 
strictures of precedent and stare decisis and a system of automatic defer-
ence to prior adjudication once the criteria for selective incorporation have 
been satisfied turns on one’s views about whether the sort of moral reason-
ing required in constitutional adjudication is amenable to systematic regula-
tion adequate to restrain judicial actors in a democracy. 
On the one side are those, like Learned Hand, who take the position 
that the clash of values inherent in important questions of individual consti-
tutional rights simply cannot be made to yield to objective standards.  Such 
questions, said Hand, “demand the appraisal and balancing of human values 
                                                          
 124.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 67–68 (1988). 
 125.  This could involve the decisions of an out-of-state court, a non-binding federal court de-
cision, or the decision of a foreign court.  The latter category has been subject to special contro-
versy in recent years and was also the subject of dispute among some of the Justices in Roper.  See 
Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of 
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and The Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 743, 748, 909 (2005). 
 126.  Justice Frankfurter captured this set of ideas in his concurrence in Adamson by explain-
ing:  
We are called upon to apply to the difficult issues of our own day the wisdom afforded 
by the great opinions in this field . . . . This guidance bids us to be duly mindful of the 
heritage of the past . . . .  As judges charged with the delicate task of subjecting the 
government of a continent to the Rule of Law we must be particularly mindful that it is 
‘a constitution we are expounding,’ so that it should not be imprisoned in what are 
merely legal forms even though they have the sanction of the Eighteenth Century.   
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Missouri v. 
Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877)).  
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which there are no scales to weigh.”127  Because the values in conflict often 
are incommensurable, the resolution of these questions must depend on the 
selection of one set of values over another, and thus must turn on the 
judge’s own preferences.128  On the other side are those who argue that the 
values often in competition in due process analysis and other similar ques-
tions of constitutional interpretation need not be treated as absolute or nec-
essarily in collision, but instead can be managed through a careful process 
of accommodation.129  Adherents of this view are more likely to be com-
fortable with the flexible common law system of adjudication and less in-
clined to seek the discipline of jot-for-jot incorporation.130 
At the root of these divergent perspectives is a difference in under-
standing how values operate more generally in the process of moral deci-
sionmaking.  Drawing from the work of pragmatist thinkers like John Dew-
ey, one might say that values are not fixed or intrinsic moral principles but 
rather are dynamic generalizations built out of past practice that inform eth-
ical analysis moving forward.131  Dewey’s work emphasized that general-
ized ethical principles, while “intellectual instrumentalities in judgment of 
particular cases,” are derived not from a priori first principles, but from ex-
perience itself.132  As a product of the empirical assessment of the results of 
prior decisions, they ought to be treated as revisable, contingent guides to 
moral evaluation instead of fixed or immutable laws.  Dewey emphasized 
that the process of “determining the true good cannot be done once for all,” 
but must “be done, and done over and over and over again, in terms of the 
conditions of concrete situations as they arise.”133 
Once the competing values at stake in a question of constitutional 
rights are understood in this fashion to be contingent, contextual, and dy-
namic, one’s conception of adjudication and decision can be moved from 
that of selecting one absolute moral preference over another to a process of 
accommodating competing claims through a gradual process of judgment 
and revision.  So put, the judicial task becomes something quite apart from 
Learned Hand’s ungovernable selection of incommensurable ethical choices 
and instead appears to be subject to reasonable regulation and review: 
                                                          
 127.  Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY 172, 178 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952). 
 128.  See Kadish, supra note 25, at 348. 
 129.  See id. (“[W]hat is demanded is not so much the resolution of conflicting values as the 
accommodation of values . . . .”). 
 130.  Perhaps the leading contemporary academic proponent of this view is Cass Sunstein, 
whose theory of “Burkean Minimalism” in constitutional decisionmaking is intended expressly to 
permit the accommodation of competing perspectives and positions.  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006).   
 131.  See Richard C. Boldt, Public Education as Public Space: Some Reflections on the Unfin-
ished Work of Marc Feldman, 61 MD. L. REV. 13, 45 (2002). 
 132.  13 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS 230, 412 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988). 
 133.  7 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS 212 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1985). 
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 The impasse is at least partly a product of the way of stating the 
question.  When the issue is put in terms of the collision of abso-
lutely stated values, perhaps there is little room for other than a 
personally anchored like or dislike. . . . The insight of the prag-
matic philosophers is a useful one; that is, that values are not 
once-and-forever-stated absolutes, but are, after the fashion of 
scientific law or principles, tentatively formulated generalizations 
which explain the resolution of past moral impasses and which 
serve to give direction to the solution of new ones.  Stated values, 
therefore, are distilled formulations of wants discovered by exam-
ining past solutions to problems of choice. . . .  So viewed, what 
is demanded is not so much the resolution of conflicting values as 
the accommodation of values . . . .134 
In these terms, the common law system of gradual refinement and de-
velopment of constitutional doctrine can be seen to operate as a flexible but 
constraining environment within which constitutional judges may be able to 
function consistent with the demands of democratic governance.  As Justice 
Harlan put it in Duncan: “Apart from the . . . absolute incorporationists, I 
can see only one method of analysis that has any internal logic.  That is to 
start with the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due process of law’ and attempt to define 
them in a way that accords with American traditions and our system of gov-
ernment.”135  Or, as Justice Frankfurter explained in Adamson: 
 [The due process] standards of justice are not authoritatively 
formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a 
pharmacopoeia.  But neither does the application of the Due Pro-
cess Clause imply that judges are wholly at large.  The judicial 
judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within 
the accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the id-
iosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.136 
While not a perfect parallel to the mid-twentieth century debate over 
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, the competing positions regarding the appropriate role 
of state courts in interpreting state constitutional provisions with federal an-
alogs do resonate with many of the essential arguments from that earlier 
era.  At stake are similarly contested conceptions of the judicial function 
and the capacity of appellate courts to navigate a process of moral judgment 
                                                          
 134.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 348. 
 135.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 136.  Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Cf. Charles Fried, 
Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994) (discussing how the need for continuity 
and stability in constitutional law is derived not simply by following precedent but by attending to 
“doctrine”). 
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within a system of constraining structures and doctrines.  It is to that related 
field of debate that we now turn. 
II.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
One of the most important developments in American constitutional-
ism over the last thirty-five years has been a renewed focus on state consti-
tutions as a source of individual rights.  State courts have long been active 
in interpreting the structural provisions of their respective state constitutions 
and in providing independent interpretations of rights guarantees for which 
there are no analogous federal guarantees.137  When state courts have been 
asked to interpret provisions of their state constitutions to which there are 
analogous provisions of the federal constitution, however, they have en-
countered significant questions of legitimacy.138 
The selective incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights, coupled with 
the rights-expanding jurisprudence of the Warren Court in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, led advocates and judges to look almost exclusively to the fed-
eral constitution as the source of an expanding field of individual rights.139  
Beginning in the late 1970s, when the Burger Court threatened a con-
striction of constitutional rights, a new focus on state constitutions as an al-
ternative source of rights emerged.140  Almost from the start, this interest in 
a “new federalism,” with its emphasis on state constitutional law, prompted 
skeptics to raise questions about whether (and, if so, when) it is appropriate 
for a state court to provide an independent interpretation of a state constitu-
                                                          
 137.  In these areas of state constitutional law (structural provisions and rights for which there 
is no federal analog), there never has been a question of the legitimacy of a state court interpreting 
such a provision.  See generally Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory to the 
Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 411, 
418–19 (2012). 
 138.  These questions of legitimacy arise most frequently in dissenting judicial opinions, in 
which the dissenting judge rejects the majority’s decision to depart from the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of an analogous provision.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 138; see also People v. Dis-
brow, 545 P.2d 272, 284–85 (Cal. 1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he newly discovered 
separate and independent state constitutional interpretations are . . . . not calculated to produce that 
kind of uniformity or harmony conducive to the logical and uniform development of constitutional 
law.”); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1350, 1356 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that majority opinion reflected a “mere disagreement” with federal constitutional doctrine 
and reflected personal preferences); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24–45 (Tex. 1992) 
(Hecht, J., concurring); H.C. Macgill, Introduction—Upon a Peak in Darien: Discovering the 
Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 7, 9 (1982) (“There probably remains some feeling 
on the bench as well as in the bar that a state constitutional holding is something of a cute trick, if 
not a bit of nose-thumbing at the federal Supreme Court, and not ‘real’ constitutional law at all.”). 
 139.  See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ¶ 1.01 n.10 (1995) (“A generation of overreliance by law profes-
sors, judges, and attorneys on the federal doctrines that grew out of Warren era has left state con-
stitutional law in a condition of near atrophy in some states.”). 
 140.  See A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger 
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 874 (1976). 
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tional provision for which there is a federal analog.141  The state constitu-
tional law literature describes three choices open to state courts presented 
with claims that arise under state constitutional provisions for which there is 
a reasonable federal constitutional analog.142 
A.  The Primacy Approach 
Justice Hans Linde, formerly of the Oregon Supreme Court, is the 
principal exponent of the primacy approach—the strategy that he terms 
“first things first.”143  Linde argues that it is the obligation of a state court, 
in every instance, to first consult the state constitution to determine if an ac-
tivity is protected: 
 The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  
Nothing in the state’s law or constitution can diminish a federal 
right.  But no state court needs or, in my view, ought to hold that 
the law of its state denies what the Federal Constitution demands, 
without at least discussing the guarantees provided in its own bill 
of rights.144 
Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington Supreme Court has elabo-
rated on the primacy model.  He explains that a state’s particular history, 
the structure of its constitution, and established doctrine in that jurisdiction 
all provide an appropriate basis for an interpretive outcome that may be dis-
tinct from federal law.  Even when the specific state constitutional text is 
similar to the United States Constitution, and even when case law within the 
federal system is well developed, Justice Utter and other proponents of the 
primacy approach argue that state supreme courts ought to accord federal 
                                                          
 141.  See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 
961 (1982) (identifying critics of new federalism); David Margolick, State Judges are Shaping 
Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1982), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/19/us/state-judges-are-shaping-law-that-goes-beyond-supreme-
court-courts-trial-last.html?pagewanted=all (“Not everyone, however, shares the present enthusi-
asm for the ‘rediscovery’ of state constitutions.”).  Professor Robert Williams has identified six 
categories representing varying degrees of similarity between state constitutional provisions and 
their federal analogs: (1) provisions that are “textually identical to their federal counterparts”; (2) 
provisions that “are only slightly different textually from their federal counterparts”; 
(3) provisions that are “substantially different from their federal counterparts”; (4) provisions 
“with no federal counterpart or federal ‘analog’”; (5) provisions that are limitations on govern-
ment but that are not contained within state declarations of rights; and (6) unenumerated rights 
provisions.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 115–18. 
 142.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 140–77; see also Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About 
State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 845–47 (2011). 
 143.  Linde, supra note 13, at 380. 
 144.  Id. at 383. 
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law persuasive authority but need not treat it as more persuasive than the 
interpretations of sister states with similar provisions.145 
Professor Robert F. Williams has taken this approach one step further.  
He has argued that “[the United States] Supreme Court interpretations of 
similar or identical federal constitutional provisions are entitled to less 
weight than decisions of sister state jurisdictions.  Horizontal federalism, or 
reliance upon decisions of other states, should be more persuasive.”146  Wil-
liams grounds this position in the observation that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has expressed an inclination to risk the under-enforcement of some federal 
constitutional rights guarantees to preserve room for state supreme courts to 
adopt alternative approaches.  In San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez,147 for example, the Supreme Court decided that claims of un-
equal education funding should be subject to the least rigorous form of ju-
dicial review: rational basis review.148  Among the justifications for the 
Court’s decision was its view that one element of a healthy system of feder-
alism is the maintenance of discretion within the states to enforce equality 
in varying ways, without a federally imposed, one-size-fits-all approach.149  
Williams refers to decisions like this as applying a “federalism discount.”150  
In light of this federalism discount, he argues, state supreme courts have an 
obligation to engage in independent constitutional rights analysis within 
their state constitutional systems to ensure that the relevant individual rights 
protections are fully realized.151 
                                                          
 145.  See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on 
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. 
L. REV. 1025, 1028 (1985).  In Justice Utter’s words:  
Under the primacy model, federal law and analysis are not presumptively correct.  In 
fact, they are no more persuasive than the decisions of sister state courts.  Consequent-
ly, even when a developed body of federal doctrine is available, and the state and feder-
al texts are similar, the primacy model urges that the court look first to the state provi-
sion and to state history, doctrine, and structure.  Its examination of these state-specific 
concerns may lead it to a result that diverges from the preexisting federal interpretation.  
Only if the result grounded in state law falls below the standards of the federal constitu-
tion should the court decide the case under federal law.  In short, the primacy model 
relegates federal law to a secondary position. 
Id.  
 146.  Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of 
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 403 (1984).  
 147.  411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 148.  Id. at 55.  
 149.  See Williams, supra note 146, at 390–91. 
 150.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 137; see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1979 (2008). 
 151.  Williams, supra note 146, at 396–97.  State supreme courts do not always make up the 
gap in rights enforcement created by the U.S. Supreme Court’s federalism discounting.  One such 
example is provided by the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Hornbeck v. Somerset 
County, 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).  Ten years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had decid-
ed that claims of unequal education funding are subjected to rational basis review.  Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1.  In Hornbeck, the Court of Appeals was asked to interpret a completely separate constitu-
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In the end, perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of the pri-
macy approach is that the alternatives are based on a mistaken premise.  
There is nothing in the federal constitution that demands or even seeks feal-
ty in the interpretation of analogous state constitutional provisions.152  It is 
therefore not disloyal to the federal constitution or the federal constitutional 
tradition independently to interpret state constitutions.153 
Professor Robert Cover formulated a useful analogy to explain why 
the primacy approach is beneficial to the health of our system of rights-
protection.  Cover suggested that the primacy approach provides jurisdic-
tional redundancy to ensure appropriate rights-protection.154  Imagine a me-
ta-due process guarantee that exists independently of its enforcement by 
courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts to enforce due process might fall 
short of that meta-due process guarantee, either because of a federalism dis-
count, willful under-enforcement, or a failure to appreciate the true scope of 
meta-due process.  A state supreme court engaging in an independent re-
view of a state constitutional due process analog gives the system a redun-
dant opportunity for full enforcement of meta-due process.  Although the 
state supreme court might also fall short of full enforcement of meta-due 
process, it might also succeed in full enforcement of the right.155  In this 
way, independent state constitutional review provides a redundant but im-
portant check to increase the likelihood of full enforcement of a right. 
The most important concerns with adopting a primacy approach center 
on questions of legitimacy.  These legitimacy concerns are framed in three 
ways.  First, at an earlier stage in the development of the new judicial feder-
alism, some critics challenged the legitimacy of the entire project.156  For 
these early critics, the very idea that a state constitution might be interpreted 
to have a different meaning than the federal constitution seemed potentially 
illegitimate.  This concern was driven, at least in part, by the politics sur-
rounding the shift from the Warren Court to the Burger and Rehnquist 
courts in the last decades of the twentieth century.  Critics argued that the 
                                                          
tional text (the “thorough and efficient” schools provision of the Maryland constitution) and, free 
from the need to take a federalism discount, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless adopted the Su-
preme Court’s Rodriguez analysis.  Hornbeck, 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d. 758.  
 152.  See Landau, supra note 142, at 847 (“The notion that a federal court decision about the 
federal Constitution somehow presumptively binds state courts in their construction of their own 
constitution seems to me especially difficult to defend.  I have yet to see anyone explain by what 
mechanism the U.S. Supreme Court possesses the authority to determine the meaning of state con-
stitutions.”). 
 153.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 135–37. 
 154.  Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Inno-
vation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 661–62 (1981). 
 155.  See id. 
 156.  See Maltz, Lockstep, supra note 11; Maltz, The Dark Side, supra note 11, at 995; 
Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11, at 975; see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 
127–30.  
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renewed interest in independent state constitutional interpretation at just this 
time had been stimulated by the desire of advocates to find alternative ven-
ues for the development of a more expansive constitutional rights regime in 
the face of conservative retrenchment on the U.S. Supreme Court.157  In 
their view, the fact that “liberal” proponents were seeking to use state con-
stitutions to evade “conservative” federal interpretations158 rendered inde-
pendent state constitutional analysis inherently suspect.159  Thus, just as Jus-
tice Black may have been attracted to incorporation doctrine in the mid-
twentieth century out of a desire to lock in negotiated doctrinal positions 
developed during the New Deal, so too the opponents of an independent 
state constitutionalism in the last portion of the century likely were drawn 
to call for incorporating federal constitutional interpretations into state con-
stitutional law by their own desire to lock in the restrictive jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court.160 
Beyond the particular politics associated either with the ordered liberty 
approach of the Supreme Court at mid-century or with the primacy ap-
proach urged by some state supreme court justices beginning in the 1970s, 
two more subtle and durable legitimacy concerns have also been raised by 
the call for an independent constitutional interpretation approach.  If, as 
some have argued, the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice of judicial review is 
in tension with the majoritarian premise of our constitutional tradition,161 
and if its incidence should therefore be minimized or delayed, then a paral-
lel practice of judicial review conducted by state judges (frequently alt-
hough not always unelected) independently interpreting state constitutional 
rights should also be minimized or eliminated if possible.  The primacy ap-
proach runs counter to this intuition, and therefore raises questions of judi-
cial legitimacy, precisely because it encourages state supreme courts to en-
gage in more, and not less, judicial review.162  Moreover, even if judicial 
review were not regarded as inherently aberrant in our democratic system, 
the decision by a state court to offer interpretations of state constitutional 
                                                          
 157.  See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Consti-
tutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 433–34 (1988). 
 158.  See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 159.  Professor Williams has labeled these legitimacy concerns an historical relic that “should 
not still be bothering state courts.”  Williams, supra note 6, at 1061. 
 160.  See, e.g., Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (1990). 
 161.  See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16. 
 162.  Critics of the primacy approach sometimes put this point in terms of state separation of 
powers concerns.  Earl Maltz, for example, has argued that the decision of a state court to interpret 
a state constitutional provision as providing individual rights protection in excess of that accorded 
by the federal constitution functions to invade the province of state legislative or executive branch 
judgments, at least in those instances in which the recognition of the state constitutional right re-
quires that a state legislative or executive branch initiative be struck down.  See Maltz, The Dark 
Side, supra note 11, at 1007–09. 
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provisions that differ from those provided by the U.S. Supreme Court with 
respect to similar or identical constitutional provisions in the federal consti-
tution is said to undermine the claims of judicial neutrality upon which the 
review function rests.  Worse still, it appears to highlight the idiosyncratic, 
personal nature of constitutional decisionmaking by courts.163 
For the critics of the primacy approach, it is more important to have 
uniformity in constitutional interpretation than to have a system of adjudi-
cation in which courts derive an answer that is correct.  In effect, this legit-
imacy concern presses toward the adoption of what David Strauss calls 
conventionalism, “the notion that it is more important that some things be 
settled than that they be settled right.”164  For example, in the late 1970s 
George Deukmejian, then-Attorney General of California,165 criticized the 
California Supreme Court for its independent interpretation of the Califor-
nia Constitution.166  Deukmejian argued both that independent interpretation 
is illegitimate and that consistency is more important than correctness.167  
Deukmejian, like Justice Black before him, was advocating for a system 
that would reduce the overall volume of judicial decisions requiring consti-
tutional interpretation.  If, however, the tension between democratic gov-
ernance and judicial decisionmaking can be managed or dissolved, then the 
case for a robust system of independent state court interpretation of state 
constitutional law as a primary matter may be viable. 
Another downside to the primacy approach is that it is apparently dif-
ficult to sustain.  Although there is no significant scholarship describing this 
phenomenon, no state supreme court has consistently maintained a com-
mitment to the primacy approach.  This may be a result of succeeding judg-
es not sharing the initial judges’ enthusiasm for primacy, a view that the 
work of primacy is simply too difficult to sustain (or is insufficiently sup-
ported by the bar), or that legitimacy concerns mount and may be additive.  
Whatever the cause, the primacy approach has to answer for its practical 
failures. 
B. The Factor Approach 
In an effort to avoid the appearance that independent state constitu-
tional decisionmaking is driven by individual policy preferences rather than 
                                                          
 163.  Cf. Landau, supra note 142, at 842–43 (“Critics contend that regarding state constitutions 
as independently significant has done little more than provide state courts with an opportunity to 
depart from federal constitutional principles and reach results more pleasing to those courts than 
the federal law would otherwise allow.”). 
 164.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
907 (1996). 
 165.  Deukmejian served as Attorney General from 1979 to 1983 and as Governor of Califor-
nia from 1983 to 1991. 
 166.  Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11, at 996–97. 
 167.  See id. at 1009–10. 
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dispassionate interpretation, some courts and commentators have suggested 
that state courts should engage in independent constitutional analysis only 
in certain circumstances.  Thus, they have suggested the use of a number of 
factors to guide state supreme courts in determining when to decline to fol-
low a federal interpretation.168  One formulation of proposed factors was set 
out by the Washington Supreme Court: 
The following non-exclusive neutral criteria are relevant in de-
termining whether, in a given situation, the Washington State 
Constitution should be considered as extending broader rights to 
its citizens than the United States Constitution: (1) the textual 
language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; 
(4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) mat-
ters of particular state or local concern.169 
Just as Justice Black suggested that selective incorporation, while less 
constraining than total incorporation, nevertheless provided more discipline 
than the ordered liberty approach,170  supporters of the factor approach simi-
larly suggest that by preventing state courts from engaging in independent 
state constitutional analysis unless certain conditions are met, courts can 
avoid (or at least minimize) claims of illegitimacy.171  Criticism of the fac-
tor approach comes from both sides.  Some argue that it is insufficiently 
deferential to federal Supreme Court interpretations,172 while others assert 
that state courts too readily accede to the prior federal formulation, thereby 
creating an unwarranted presumption of correctness in the federal interpre-
tation.173  In practice, courts adopting the factor approach have been incon-
sistent in applying it, have squabbled about the governing factors, and have 
                                                          
 168.  This is referred to in the literature as the “interstitial,” “criteria,” or “factor” approach.  
See A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 
VA. L. REV. 873, 934–44 (1976) (identifying seven factors to justify divergent state court interpre-
tation); Robin B. Johansen, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State 
Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 318–19 (1977) (listing four factors that a state should consid-
er before engaging in an independent constitutional analysis). 
 169.  State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986).  Other states have adopted similar 
lists of factors, including Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  See State v. Geis-
ler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 156–57 (Ill. 1984); 
State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650–51 (N.J. 1983); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964–67 (N.J. 
1982) (Handler, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894–95 (Pa. 1991).  
 170.  See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 171.  See Geisler, 610 A.2d at 1232; Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 156–57; Williams, 459 A.2d at 650–
51; Hunt, 450 A.2d at 964–67; Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894–95; Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811; see also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 146–60; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitu-
tions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 731–33 (1991). 
 172.  See Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 
1123, 1136–37 (1992) (criticizing Commonwealth v. Edmunds for including among its factors 
“case-law from other states” but not from the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 173.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 171; Williams, supra note 6, at 1023; Dan Friedman, The 
History, Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 637, 645–46 (1998). 
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allowed disagreements over the application of the factors to overtake analy-
sis of the underlying disputes.174  As Louis Henkin pointed out with respect 
to selective incorporation, a regime that only sometimes defaults to prior 
judicial interpretation, must rely on a “principle of selection” for determin-
ing when to incorporate existing doctrine and when to permit a new con-
struction of constitutional text.  The exercise of discretion regarding this 
principle is likely to be as much a source of judicial judgment as the under-
lying constitutional dispute itself.175  Thus, almost by necessity, the promise 
of the factor approach as a means for cabining judicial decisionmaking has 
not been realized. 
C.  The Lockstep Approach 
Finally, there are those who would bind the interpretation of state con-
stitutions to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous federal consti-
tutional provisions.  Advocates of this approach believe that it is never—or, 
in its moderate form, rarely—appropriate for a state court to give a different 
meaning, or to provide a different interpretation to a state constitutional 
provision than the interpretation given by the U.S. Supreme Court to an 
analogous provision of the federal constitution.176  This is generally de-
scribed as “lockstepping,” as the interpretation of the state constitutional 
provision is meant to travel in lockstep with the federal interpretation, ex-
panding and receding as the Supreme Court modifies its interpretation.177 
As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish the lockstep approach 
from “unreflective adoptionism,” in which the state court does not even 
acknowledge the possibility of a divergent interpretation.178  This position, 
which governed in many states from the 1960s until the early 1990s, simply 
ignores the state constitution and resolves claims of right by reference to the 
federal constitution only.179  The lockstep approach also is different than 
                                                          
 174.  See State v. Hill, 675 A.2d 866, 875 n.23 (Conn. 1996); State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 
1323 (Conn. 1993); People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604, 611–12 (Ill. 1996); People v. Washing-
ton, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (Ill. 1996); Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 961 n.6 (Pa. 
1995); State v. Gocken, 896 P.2d 1267, 1270–72 (Wash. 1995); Sofie v. Fibreboard Co., 771 P.2d 
711, 716–18 (Wash. 1989); State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797, 800–01 (Wash. 1988).  These exam-
ples and others are discussed in WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 150–62. 
 175.  Henkin, supra note 23, at 82. 
 176.  See Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11; Kahn, supra note 11; Maltz, Lockstep, 
supra note 11; Maltz, The Dark Side, supra note 11. 
 177.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 200–05 (discussing State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 
767 (Ohio 1997)). 
 178.  See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-
by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005); 
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 196–97 (attributing the phrase “unreflective adoptionism” to Barry 
Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (1991)). 
 179.  For these courts, it is not a question, for example, of the privilege against self-
incrimination, but rather one of “taking the Fifth.” 
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“reflective, case-by-case adoption,” in which a state court acknowledges the 
possibility of divergent outcomes, considers the arguments, and, on balance, 
decides to apply the federal analysis to a state constitutional provision.180  
Reflective, case-by-case adoption is essentially the treatment of federal con-
stitutional law as persuasive authority, developed by competent judges 
(with better resources).  Finally, we are not here concerned with state con-
stitutional amendments requiring a forced linkage of the interpretation of 
the state constitution to that of the federal constitution.181 
Instead, our focus is what might be called “prospective lockstep-
ping.”182  This occurs where a state court announces that it will, in the fu-
ture, tie its interpretation of a state constitutional provision to the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of a similar or analogous federal provision.  
The academic literature defending prospective lockstepping is sparse183 and 
the academic criticism is nearly universal.184  With the exception of the rare 
state constitutional amendment linking the interpretation of state provisions 
to the federal constitution, there are no formal requirements either in the 
federal constitution or in most state constitutions that compel the lockstep 
approach.  Thus, the arguments for this form of incorporation are essentially 
prudential.  The principal arguments revolve around perceived interests in 
uniformity and legitimacy.185  Courts and commentators point out that uni-
                                                          
 180.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 197–200 (citing State v. McLellan, 817 A.2d 309, 312–
13 (N.H. 2003); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544–47 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Scott, 183 
P.3d 801, 829–30 (Kan. 2008)). 
 181.  See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“[Th[e] right to be secure from unreasonable searches 
and seizures] shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”); FLA. CONST. art. I § 17 (forced 
linkage regarding cruel and unusual punishment); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (forced linkage re-
garding school busing); Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Federalism and the Florida Constitution: The Self-
Inflicted Wounds of Thrown-Away Independence from the Control of the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 701 (2003); Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the 
Limits of Florida’s “Forced Linkage” Amendment, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 653 (1987); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 23, at 128–29. 
 182.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 200–09. 
 183.  See Kahn, supra note 11; Maltz, Lockstep, supra note 11, at 100; Maltz, The Dark Side, 
supra note 11, at 995; Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11, at 975. 
 184.  See Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—The Montana Disaster, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1985); John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age 
of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived from Fed-
eral Sources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 195, 234–37 (1990); James A. Gardner, The 
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 804–05 (1992); see generally, 
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 224–29. 
 185.  See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, Jr., supra note 11, at 975.  Paul Kahn takes a differ-
ent approach.  He argues that state constitutional law improperly focuses on unique state charac-
teristics as a basis for independent state constitutional analysis.  Kahn, supra note 11, at 1147.  
Instead, Kahn argues that state courts should ignore these unique state characteristics and focus on 
an “American constitutionalism.”  Id.  The result of his analysis, however, is to establish a system 
of prospective lockstepping.  A third proponent of prospective lockstepping is Professor Earl M. 
Maltz of Rutgers Law School.  See Maltz, Lockstep, supra note 11, at 98–99; Maltz, The Dark 
Side, supra note 11, at 995. 
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formity needs are heightened in certain areas of constitutional analysis, in-
cluding, particularly, search and seizure and other issues of criminal proce-
dure.186  In addition, prospective lockstepping is easier for the state court 
system and leaves the U.S. Supreme Court firmly in charge of the develop-
ment of constitutional doctrine.  With respect to legitimacy, a critical result 
of prospective lockstepping is that there are fewer opportunities for state 
constitutional courts to exercise judgment over the meaning of state consti-
tutional provisions that are open textured or amenable to competing con-
structions.  This systematic reliance on the prior judicial interpretation of 
the federal constitution, much like the systematic adoption of prior deci-
sions by selective incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment context, 
simply reduces the overall incidence of judicial judgment and diminishes 
the number of cases in which similar bits of constitutional text are given in-
consistent effect. 
On the other side, there are a number of criticisms of prospective lock-
stepping.187  First, critics point out that, because prospective lockstepping 
changes the meaning of the state constitution to match the federal constitu-
tion, the adoption of this approach constitutes, as Justice Robert Utter of the 
Washington Supreme Court has put it, a virtual “rewrite” of the state consti-
tution without the people’s consent.188  Similarly, Professor Ronald Collins 
has called it “[a]mending [w]ithout [a]mendments.”189  Second, critics of 
prospective lockstepping argue that it operates as an inappropriate or un-
necessary “precommitment device,” in that it commits a future court to de-
cide a future case in a manner decreed by the current court.190  Third, to the 
extent that jurisdictional redundancy is offered as a benefit of independent 
state constitutional interpretation,191 prospective lockstepping deprives the 
system of that benefit.192  And fourth, lockstepping in one case or with re-
gard to one provision acts to inhibit the growth of state constitutional schol-
arship in other cases and with respect to other provisions.  Thus, lockstep-
ping encourages lockstepping. 
                                                          
 186.  See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Florance, 527 
P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974); State v. Arias, 752 N.W. 2d 748, 754–55 (Wis. 2008). 
 187.  For a catalog of those criticisms, see WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 224–29, and Williams, 
supra note 178, at 1520–27. 
 188.  State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (Utter, J., concurring). 
 189.  Collins, supra note 184, at 1116. 
 190.  Williams, supra note 178, at 1522–23 (quoting Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in 
the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 366 (2001)).  The difference between 
this dynamic and traditional notions of stare decisis is that, in the application of stare decisis, the 
court commits itself to treat factually analogous cases in the same manner.  Prospective lockstep-
ping commits a court to follow federal interpretations in different factual scenarios and even when 
the federal Supreme Court changes its interpretation. 
 191.  Cover, supra note 154. 
 192.  Williams, supra note 178. 
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In the end, the claimed advantages in uniformity to be derived from a 
lockstep approach are far outweighed by the interests which can be derived 
from state supreme courts interpreting their individual state constitutions 
with due regard for the unique history, culture, constitutional structure, and 
legal tradition of their respective jurisdictions.  These advantages in redun-
dancy are structural features of our federalist system and militate against the 
abdication of interpretive responsibility by prospective lockstepping.  As 
we explain in the next Section, the legitimacy concerns growing out of the 
very enterprise of judicial interpretation of constitutions are surmountable 
in this context, just as they were in the context of Justice Black’s advocacy 
for total incorporation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  If the arguments for prospective lockstepping, the analog to 
incorporation in the state constitutional law context, are essentially pruden-
tial, it is apparent that state courts acting with prudence and with due regard 
for the broader matrix of social and government institutions within which 
they operate can engage in the practice of constitutional interpretation and 
still be responsible to the essential demands of democratic governance.193 
                                                          
 193.  Although the literature is clear in describing three methods of state constitutional inter-
pretation (primacy, factor, and lockstep), the Court of Appeals of Maryland uses a different label, 
frequently describing a provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as being “in pari mate-
ria” with an analogous provision of the federal constitution.  WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 197 
(noting that the use of the phrase in pari materia by the Court of Appeals of Maryland is “not en-
tirely clear” but the term appears to indicate an “‘unreflective adoptionism’ approach”).  The 
phrase obscures more than it illuminates.  First, the courts use it inconsistently.  Friedman, supra 
note 173, at 682 n.111.  Sometimes, the phrase is used to mean that two provisions arose to ad-
dress the same or a similar problem, arose from the same origins, or developed contemporaneous-
ly.  More frequently, the phrase is used as shorthand to mean that the provision is to be given the 
same interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court gives to the identical provision of the federal con-
stitution.  Second, it improperly gives the impression that a current court can prospectively bind 
future courts to follow changes in U.S. Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence.  Williams, 
supra note 178, at 1520–27 (discussing the problems of “prospective lockstepping”).   
  For example, the right of a criminal defendant to confront his or her accusers is protected 
both by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MD. CONST. DECL. RIGHTS art. 21.  In 1980, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Roberts, said that out-of-court statements could be admissible 
without confrontation if they included “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”  448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then found that Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights was to be interpreted as in pari materia with the Sixth Amendment analysis, thereby agree-
ing to adopt the Ohio v. Roberts framework.  Craig v. State, 322 Md. 418, 430, 588 A.2d 328, 334 
(1991).  In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed course, rejected Ohio v. Roberts, and adopted a 
new jurisprudence based on the “testimonial nature” of an out-of-court statement.  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Dutifully, the Court of Appeals changed its Article 21 jurispru-
dence to match—without any analysis indicating that Crawford in fact provided a better frame-
work for understanding the provision.  See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 74 n.9, 867 A.2d 
314, 320 n.9 (2005).  It was wrong for the pre-Crawford Court of Appeals to purport to bind itself 
to as-yet unseen jurisprudence, and it was wrong for the Court of Appeals to have reflexively fol-
lowed the Supreme Court when it changed direction in Crawford.  It should only have changed 
Maryland’s jurisprudence if it thought that the Crawford method provided a better framework for 
understanding Article 21.  Rather than continuing to use the phrase “in pari materia,” Maryland 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS SPECTATOR AND AS AGENT 
In its recent decision in State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court held that the state’s capital punishment scheme “no longer comports 
with contemporary standards of decency,” and was therefore prohibited by 
the state’s constitution.194  The Santiago court paid considerable attention to 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s cases interpreting that federal constitutional 
provision, but ultimately adopted an interpretation of the relevant state con-
stitutional provisions that departs in important respects from the parallel 
federal constitutional doctrine.  The choices the Connecticut court made in 
filling this space between the Eighth Amendment and the state’s constitu-
tion provide a demonstration of the ways in which state constitutional 
courts can mitigate the concerns of Justice Black and contemporary propo-
nents of the lockstep approach, that judicial decisionmaking based on open-
textured constitutional rights provisions inherently tends to corrode the fab-
ric of majoritarian democracy. 
The case for incorporation in either the Fourteenth Amendment con-
text or the state constitutional law context is based, in part, on the asserted 
illegitimacy of this sort of judicial function, which is the Benthamite cri-
tique of the common law applied to constitutional adjudication.  In this re-
spect, the premise that led Justice Black and that leads contemporary pro-
ponents of the lockstep view to urge constitutional courts to default to the 
work of prior adjudicators is that legitimate constitutional adjudication 
must, to use Catherine Wells’s terms, be “structured” rather than “situated” 
decisionmaking.195  Deferring to a prior adjudication is said to accomplish 
this end, because it permits the later-in-time court to function entirely as a 
“spectator,” thereby avoiding the exercise of independent agency that “inev-
itably bring[s] [a court’s] own distinctive perspective to [its] consideration 
of the case.”196 
Proponents of the lockstep approach argue that when a state supreme 
court interprets a state constitutional provision in a fashion that departs 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of an analogous parallel fed-
eral constitutional provision, the overall legitimacy of the constitutional 
system is reduced.  To these commentators, the inconsistency in interpreta-
tion stands as evidence that the respective courts have imposed their own 
preferences instead of applying those embedded in constitutional text and, 
                                                          
courts should develop clearer ways to express the current relationship between the interpretations 
given to the state and federal constitutions. 
 194.  122 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2015).   
 195.  See generally Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 
(1990). 
 196.  Id. at 1729.  
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perhaps, tradition.197  But this claim, that constitutional adjudication must 
avoid inconsistent results to guard against illegitimacy, has been challenged 
by other theorists on the grounds that a measured and prudentially managed 
indeterminacy does not necessarily threaten the basic legitimacy of the sys-
tem.198  Instead, it may open a space within which “a fact-responsive equity 
has room to operate.”199 
This sharp disagreement about the judicial function need not be the 
end of the discussion.  In the next Section, we explore the relationship be-
tween structured and situated decisionmaking and the false dichotomy that 
is sometimes set up between these two ways of thinking about the work of 
constitutional courts.  Then, to provide a concrete example of a more inte-
grated perspective, we trace the analytic path taken by the Connecticut Su-
preme Court in its Santiago opinion.  This Part concludes by drawing to-
gether the work of several theorists who have offered suggestions for 
managing the competing obligations imposed on judges adjudicating consti-
tutional claims in a democracy.  Taken together, the approach they offer, 
which we have termed pragmatic prudentialism, offers the promise of dis-
solving, at least to some degree, the tension between our understanding of 
constitutional courts as spectators and as agents. 
A.  Structured and Situated Decisionmaking 
Professor Wells argues that normative decisionmaking, including con-
stitutional adjudication of the type undertaken by the Santiago court, neces-
sarily is a complex practice that engages both the agent’s and the spectator’s 
perspectives.200  The distinction between the role of “agent” and “spectator” 
is familiar to students of ethics and epistemology.  Agent-centered theories 
assess “the rationality of certain beliefs and values with reference not to an 
abstractly conceived philosophical foundation, but rather to a contingent 
web of experience and location that provides individual agents with their 
own particular point of view.”201  Applied to the judicial function, Wells 
suggests that adoption of the agent’s role yields situated decisionmakers 
who bring their own particular subjective perspective to their consideration 
of individual cases, understood in context.202  By contrast, the spectator’s 
role yields a model of judicial decisionmaking characterized by a formalist 
commitment to objective first-principles and the application of stable rules 
                                                          
 197.  See supra text accompanying notes 19–22. 
 198.  Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 439 (1990). 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See Wells, supra note 195, at 1728–29. 
 201.  See id. 
 202.  Id. at 1745 (“Such judgments are relative to a perspective; they are situated in prior expe-
rience and affected by normative attitudes.”). 
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for decision that essentially are closed to fundamental revision based on the 
specific circumstances presented in any given case.203 
As critics of legal formalism have long observed, the judicial function 
is inconsistent with an unyielding form of structured decisionmaking.204  
The judge as pure spectator may be a popular trope deployed by some nom-
inees to the Supreme Court in confirmation hearings,205 but as Wells 
demonstrates, the very enterprise of decisionmaking requires courts—even 
those that aspire to a structured approach—to exercise discretion in charac-
terizing a case by type and in selecting and applying the facts to the chosen 
rules for resolution of the legal question presented.206  Moreover, as Wells 
points out, “the structures that are used to analyze cases are themselves sit-
uated in a particular history of adjudicating cases and in a particular set of 
purposes for engaging in adjudicatory activity.”207  On this account, those 
who would limit state constitutional adjudicators to the task of “resolving 
specific cases in accordance with previously established norms of judg-
ment,”208 offer a pinched, unrealistic agenda for state courts interpreting 
state constitutions. 
Wells’s more complex account of judicial decisionmaking demon-
strates that neither structured nor situated decisionmaking can operate inde-
pendently of the other.209  Just as perspective and context necessarily inform 
the steps of structured decisionmaking, so too a commitment to situated de-
cisionmaking requires “structuring methods such as reason, generalization, 
and abstraction.”210  It simply is an “oversimplification” to think of the 
spectator and the agent as two separate and distinct judicial roles.211  For 
Wells, a given instance of adjudication is better described as a point on a 
continuum, in which one pole is marked out by the pure but unattainable-in-
practice prototype of the judicial spectator and the other by an equally elu-
sive form of situated judgment of the sort assumed by naïve realists.212  The 
force of this observation is apparent in the Santiago case, to which we now 
turn. 
                                                          
 203.  See id. at 1729. 
 204.  See id. 
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B.  State v. Santiago: A Case Study 
In 2012, the Connecticut legislature passed, and the Governor signed 
into law, a statute that prospectively repealed the state’s death penalty.213  
Three years earlier, during the legislature’s consideration of a virtually 
identical bill, the state’s chief prosecutor and the state’s Division of Crimi-
nal Justice provided testimony in which they advised the lawmakers that a 
prospective repeal would “effectively abolish the death penalty for anyone 
who has not yet been executed because it would be untenable as a matter of 
[state] constitutional law.”214  In 2015, an offender who had been sentenced 
to death sought to prevent his execution on these grounds (and others).  In a 
wide-ranging opinion that offers considerable insight into the role that state 
courts can assume in construing state constitutional rights, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in State v. Santiago granted him relief.215 
The Santiago decision is a rich case study for considering the question 
of how state supreme courts ought to proceed when faced with a state con-
stitutional issue that parallels federal constitutional doctrine.  The court 
concluded that the application of the capital sanction against Santiago and 
others sentenced to death in Connecticut prior to 2012 and still on death 
row would violate the state’s constitution.216  On one hand, the Santiago 
court reached this conclusion by employing the “evolving standards of de-
cency” analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Eighth 
Amendment proportionality case law—including its cases limiting the death 
eligibility of persons with intellectual disabilities and juveniles.217  On the 
other hand, the Court acknowledged that Connecticut’s constitution does 
not contain a distinct provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment—
the operative language of the Eighth Amendment—and instead relied on 
two due process clauses in the Connecticut constitution as the textual foun-
dation for its decision.218  Nevertheless, the constitutional question in Santi-
                                                          
 213.  2012 Conn. Acts 12-5 (Reg. Session). 
 214.  State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 10 (2015) (citing Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hear-
ings, Judiciary, Pt. 9, 2009 Sess., p. 2716 (Conn. 2009)); see also id. at 9 n.1. 
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Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of intellectually disabled indi-
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life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor exces-
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ago, as understood by the Connecticut Supreme Court was whether the ap-
plication of capital punishment would be “cruel and unusual,” and, in those 
terms, the Eighth Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty 
case law cast a heavy shadow on the opinion.219  Given that the language of 
the state’s constitution, which the court viewed as reflecting the state’s 
unique history and culture, is not identical, or even similar, to the federal 
constitution, the Connecticut Supreme Court was able to open up sufficient 
maneuvering room to articulate a substantive analysis that, while borrowing 
from federal constitutional law, departed from the bottom line conclusions 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in this area.220 
Well before it took up the Santiago case, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court had established that both structured and situated elements appropri-
ately ought to play a role in its efforts to construe the state’s constitution.  
In its 1990 decision in State v. Lamme,221 the court had explained that “[t]he 
adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate 
open textured provisions in our own organic document in no way compro-
mises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state 
constitution.”222  Accordingly, the Santiago court explained, “We are not 
necessarily bound for state constitutional purposes, to reach the same con-
clusions as the United States Supreme Court . . . .”223  Clearly, then, in re-
solving the claims raised by Mr. Santiago, the court could not simply de-
fault to a lockstep approach, and could not thereby avoid exercising 
adjudicatory agency over the question of the permissibility of ongoing exe-
cutions in the state.  At the same time, however, the court also made plain 
that its decision was the result of a process that had been carefully struc-
tured by the federal framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
Eighth Amendment cases.  The court explained that it previously had 
“adopted, as a matter of state constitutional law, this federal framework for 
evaluating challenges to allegedly cruel and unusual punishments.”224  
Thus, the Santiago court was at once tethered to an analytic path established 
by federal constitutional decisional authority and, at the same time, at liber-
ty to adjust that course according to its best judgment under the circum-
stances. 
                                                          
 219.  Santiago, 122 A.3d at 9. 
 220.  It is worth noting that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s consideration of the constitution-
ality of the death penalty came up in Santiago framed as a question that has not been addressed 
directly by the U.S. Supreme Court: the impact of a prospective abolition on the constitutionality 
of existing capital sentences in a state.  The Santiago court employed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
evolving standards framework to find the death penalty in Connecticut unconstitutional, but one 
significant data point in its assessment of the state’s evolving standards was the legislature’s deci-
sion to prospectively abolish the capital sanction.  
 221.  579 A.2d 484 (Conn. 1990). 
 222.  Id. at 490. 
 223.  Santiago, 122 A.3d at 16 n.17. 
 224.  Id. at 16.  
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To transverse this path as both a structured and a situated deci-
sionmaker, the Santiago court relied on a template for analysis that it had 
set out in its prior opinions.  In State v. Geisler,225 the Connecticut Supreme 
Court had identified six “nonexclusive tools of analysis” to consider when 
determining “the scope and parameters of the state’s constitution.”  Those 
factors are: “(1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) historical in-
sights into the intent of our constitutional forebears [sic]; (3) the operative 
constitutional text; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive prece-
dents of other states; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable 
economic and sociological norms, or, as otherwise described, relevant pub-
lic policies.”226  The Santiago court explained that it had employed the 
Geisler factors to “inform” its application of the state’s constitutional 
standards, which, in turn, it claimed, “derive from United States Supreme 
Court precedent concerning the Eighth Amendment.”227  The court further 
explained that it had utilized the Geisler factors “to flesh out the general na-
ture and parameters of the state constitutional provision at issue,” but had 
not “perform[ed] the substantive legal analysis under the somewhat artifi-
cial auspices of the six Geisler factors.”228 
Organized in this fashion, the Santiago opinion begins with a consid-
eration of the federal constitutional standards for what constitutes imper-
missibly cruel and unusual punishment.  After rehearsing the familiar cate-
gories, with a particular emphasis on the question of excessive and 
disproportionate punishment as measured both by an “objective” considera-
tion of “contemporary standards of decency” and by the court’s own “inde-
pendent judgment[],” the court acknowledged that “a majority of the United 
States Supreme Court has continued to hold—in the face of persistent dis-
sent—that capital punishment comports with contemporary American 
standards of decency, satisfies legitimate penological objectives, and is not 
imposed in an impermissibly arbitrary or discriminatory manner.”229  Not-
ing, however, that the precise question in the instant case—a state’s pro-
spective-only repeal—had never been addressed by a federal court, the ma-
jority ultimately struck down the application of all death sentences still 
pending in the state, federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to the contra-
ry notwithstanding.230 
After concluding its assessment of federal constitutional doctrine gov-
erning capital punishment, the Santiago court proceeded to evaluate the re-
                                                          
 225.  610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992) (citing Lamme, 579 A.2d 484). 
 226.  Id. at 1232.  In Geisher, the Court essentially adopted a variation of the factor approach 
to state constitutional interpretation discussed supra at notes 168–175 and accompanying text. 
 227.  Santiago, 122 A.3d at 15.  
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maining factors set out in the Geisler framework.  Its consideration of the 
second factor, which it characterized as “Relevant State Constitutional His-
tory,” proved to be especially consequential.231  The court’s analysis fo-
cused on two key periods in the state’s history: the decade from 1662 to 
1672, which it characterized as a “watershed in the early history of Con-
necticut;” and the years leading up to the adoption of the state’s constitution 
of 1818, upon which the current Connecticut constitution is based.232  With 
respect to the earlier period, the court concluded that Connecticut’s first 
leaders bequeathed a legacy of “judicial moderation in the use of physical 
punishments” that ensured that “long before the adoption of either the fed-
eral or state constitution, Connecticut citizens enjoyed a quasi-constitutional 
freedom from cruel punishment . . . that reflected [the state’s] unique social 
and political traditions,” and that these protections were “enshrined in Con-
necticut’s early constitutional, statues and common law.”233  With respect to 
the later period, the court explained that the “late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries in Connecticut witnessed a pronounced liberalization in 
public, legislative, and judicial attitudes toward crime and punishment,” and 
that the period was characterized by a “broader commitment to human 
rights, and the first serious public questioning of the moral legitimacy of 
capital punishment.”234  Lest there be any misunderstanding about the im-
port of this historical account, the court concluded this section of its opinion 
with the observation that the state’s particular history “warrants our scrupu-
lous and independent review of allegedly cruel and unusual practices and 
punishments, and informs our analysis thereof.”235 
Next, the court took up the question of how the state’s constitutional 
text affected its analysis.  As noted, Connecticut’s constitution does not 
have a direct analogue to the punishment provision contained within the 
federal Eight Amendment.  The author of the Santiago opinion, Justice 
Palmer, pointed out that Connecticut was one of three states among the 
original thirteen that chose not to ratify the Bill of Rights, including the 
Eight Amendment.236  He accounted for this position on the basis of the 
state’s early Calvinist tradition of limited government, its common law en-
forcement of natural rights, and its broad commitment to an unenumerated 
set of individual rights protections that derived from natural law theory and 
from the very notion of an ordered society.237  Consistent with this under-
standing, the Connecticut Supreme Court had previously recognized that 
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the state’s two due process clauses reflect a broad commitment to individual 
rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  In 
State v. Ross,238 the court had begun to define the boundaries of those rights 
in the death penalty context, and had sought to operationalize the prohibi-
tion on unconstitutionally cruel punishment by adopting the federal Eighth 
Amendment framework, with particular emphasis on the “evolving stand-
ards of human decency” analysis.239 
Because of the “unique structure and text” of the Connecticut constitu-
tion, in which the state’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is 
“embedded in [its] dual due process clauses rather than in a distinct pun-
ishments clause,” the Santiago court did not regard the case law from other 
state supreme courts to be of particular assistance in its assessment of the 
question it was addressing.240  But the Connecticut court’s consideration of 
its own precedents in the area, together with the decision of the Connecticut 
legislature and Governor prospectively to abolish capital punishment, 
proved to be important in rounding out its analysis.241  In State v. Rizzo242 
(“Rizzo I”), the Connecticut Supreme Court had recognized an “overarching 
concern” in the state constitution “for consistency and reliability in the im-
position of the death penalty,” and on that basis had interpreted the relevant 
state statutes to require a capital sentencing jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the death penalty was the appropriate sentence.243  And in its 
2011 opinion in State v. Rizzo244 (“Rizzo II”), the Connecticut Supreme 
Court employed an evolving standards of decency analysis to examine the 
permissibility of capital punishment under the state’s constitution.  While 
not reaching the conclusion that the death penalty was unconstitutional un-
der all circumstances, the Rizzo II court did hold that the court has “an in-
dependent duty to determine that the penalty remains constitutionally viable 
as the sensibilities of our citizens evolve.”245  When the state’s elected offi-
cials effectuated the prospective abolition of the practice in 2012, sufficient 
evidence of that ongoing moral evolution was available to the court, and its 
decision to strike down the application of all death sentences in the state en-
sued.246 
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C.  Pragmatic Prudentialism 
The Santiago opinion is a good example of the kind of constitutional 
pragmatism that views the judicial task not as the selection of incommen-
surable absolutes but as the accommodation of competing values through a 
process of gradual refinement and development guided by the data of ongo-
ing experience.247  This sort of pragmatism need not be complacent.  In San-
tiago, it is a “critical pragmatism” that seeks to promote justice and improve 
the law’s regulation of social arrangements.248  This pragmatic tradition of-
fers an effective response to those, like Justice Black, who seek to limit the 
very enterprise of constitutional judicial review, and finds expression in the 
constitutional prudentialism urged by Anthony Kronman, among others.249  
Instead of regarding constitutional adjudication—even over abstract and 
imprecise portions of constitutional text—as inherently corrosive of demo-
cratic government, this perspective seeks to “dissolve” the tension between 
the exercise of judicial judgment and the broad commitment to responsive 
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self-government in two ways.  First, by calling on the special institutional 
competencies of judges and, second, by assigning to constitutional courts 
the particular obligation to mediate considerations of expediency with a 
longer-term project of refining the community’s aspirational ideals, its “en-
during general values.”250 
For Kronman, following the thinking of Alexander Bickel, prudential-
ism is both an “intellectual capacity and a temperamental disposition.”251  A 
prudentially pragmatic course of constitutional decisionmaking is one in 
which the court takes into account the “complexity of its human and institu-
tional setting,” to devise strategies for accomplishing an “evolutionary rec-
onciliation of [the community’s] principles and practices.”252  Suggesting an 
alternative methodology to Justice Black’s incorporation approach to due 
process adjudication, Sanford Kadish’s classic 1957 treatment called for a 
“method of rationality” in which “what is demanded is not so much the res-
olution of conflicting values as the accommodation of values—rendering 
our ultimate wants consistent with our action by ascertaining the common 
denominator of those tentative want formulations that have arisen from past 
solutions to other problems.”253  In Kronman’s account, there is both a tem-
poral and a substantive component to this judicial function.  While elected 
officials often are inclined to act in the interest of short-term expediency, 
one responsibility of a court exercising constitutional review authority is to 
adopt a longer-term perspective.  Substantively, the court’s role is to em-
phasize “interests of a more ‘general and permanent’ sort” rather than “ma-
terial needs.”254 
The temporal and substantive dimensions in this account come togeth-
er in Kronman’s discussion of the court as a “shaper” and “educator.”255  
Kronman argues that a prudentialist jurisprudence of this sort must be root-
ed in our “moral and legal traditions.”256  But, he says, “it cannot simply re-
state them in an unchanged form; it must carry these traditions forward, in a 
principled way, by identifying their moral trajectory and the aspirational 
ideals toward which they are tending.”257  In effect, the constitutional 
court’s role is to convene the various participants concerned with a question 
of constitutional obligation to assist in developing appropriate practices that 
are informed by the enduring normative commitments identified and articu-
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lated by the court.  The outcome of any individual case need not, on this ac-
count, stand as the final resolution of the problem.  Pragmatic prudentialism 
contemplates a gradual project of refinement and progress, in which the 
court’s interventions inform the work of others inside government and be-
yond, and in turn are informed by the subsequent actions of others taken in 
response to the court’s decisions.258 
Consistent with this understanding, it is notable that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court arrived at its decision in the Santiago case only after its ear-
lier, more modest treatment of the constitutional question in Ross and Rizzo, 
and only after the state legislature and governor had weighed in.  Moreover, 
functioning as a convener and a shaper of these ongoing deliberations over 
capital punishment, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s framing of the state’s 
enduring normative commitments, as evidenced by the Santiago decision’s 
depiction of the state’s early history with respect to punishment and human 
rights, served to organize and move forward the development of a compre-
hensive assessment of the moral obligations owed by the state.259 
The description of pragmatic prudentialism advanced by Kadish and 
Kronman260 resonates with the work of other writers who have sought to 
map at least one strain of the Burkean tradition onto contemporary constitu-
tional theory.  The notion of constitutional adjudication as the gradual de-
velopment of a grounded normative project, a facilitated conversation over 
matters of enduring principle that sometimes requires courts to offer “nar-
row” and/or “shallow” decisions in individual cases in order to maintain the 
engagement of others in an ongoing moral conversation, is reflected as well 
in the work of Cass Sunstein.261  While Sunstein claims a more consequen-
tialist grounding for his form of prudentialism than that marked out by 
Kronman, there are important linkages between their accounts.262  Particu-
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The science of government being . . . a matter which requires experience, and even 
more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and ob-
serving he may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling 
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common pur-
pose of society . . . .  
Kronman, Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 249, at 1598 n.138 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 152 (Conor Cruise O’Brien ed., 1969)).  One can 
read this passage, and others from Burke that stress the importance of stable institutional arrange-
ments and the dangers of precipitous change, as embedding an inherent or intrinsic authority in 
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larly with respect to shallow rulings, Sunstein argues that a cautious ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication that produces “rationales and out-
comes on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their disagree-
ment on or uncertainty about the most fundamental issues,” permits 
judgments that can “attract shared support” from people who might other-
wise find themselves in conflict.263  By building constitutional doctrine 
gradually in this prudential or minimalist fashion, Sunstein suggests that 
courts limit the social costs of constitutional adjudication, are less prone to 
error, and reduce the intensity of social conflict.264 
Importantly, this modest conception of constitutional adjudication 
helps to meet the Benthamite objection that judicial decisionmaking neces-
sarily replaces the preferences of citizens with the preferences of judges.  
As Professor Kadish argued in the federal incorporation context, adjudica-
tion need not necessarily involve the selection of one set of values over an-
other, but instead often can be an accommodation of competing perspec-
tives, worked out over time and with the involvement of non-judicial 
actors.265  It is consistent as well with Kronman’s invocation of the “Whig 
tradition.”266 
Of course, such an accommodation is not always possible, and conflict 
is not always avoidable.  Kronman suggests that the obligation of a prudent 
politician, or judge, in such circumstances is to “prevent the conflict from 
becoming too generalized or too deeply entrenched.”267  Kadish allows that 
those occasions, when “reason will have run itself out without reliably hav-
ing indicated the grounds for choice[,]” the judge will be forced to recur to 
the “bedrock of personal choice solidly and unavoidably faced.”268  And 
Sunstein conditions his Burkean minimalist regime on the requirement that 
“long-standing traditions and practices are trustworthy, or at least trustwor-
                                                          
historical practice and tradition.  But this Burkean attention to social context and the authority of 
settled understandings can also be transposed, as Sunstein does, into a kind of rule consequential-
ist posture, in which decisionmaking that accords respect for tradition and longstanding institu-
tions is understood not as valuable for its own sake but as likely to produce better outcomes, all 
things considered.  See Sunstein, supra note 130, at 359.  
 263.  Sunstein, supra note 130, at 364. 
 264.  See id. 
 265.  See Kadish, supra note 25, at 349 (“While absolutely viewed ethical principles in diamet-
ric collision leave room perhaps only for personal choice, accommodation of wants to new social 
context is more readily seen to be more an affair of reason and knowledge—reason, by way of 
reflection upon the ultimate distillate of the multiplicity of wants when their prior formulation ap-
pears to offer no handles for decision; knowledge, by way of an estimate of the alternative lines of 
conduct available and of their consequences.”). 
 266.  Kronman, Philosophy of Prudence, supra note 249, at 1603–04 (“[I]n the domain of val-
ues as the Whig conceives it, there are no absolutes, only commitments of different and shifting 
weight. . . . What the Whig values above all else, is a workable accommodation of existing inter-
ests and ideals, one to which those affected are willing to give their consent.”). 
 267.  Id. at 1604. 
 268.  Kadish, supra note 25, at 349. 
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thy enough.”269  On each of these accounts, judges, exercising the power of 
judicial review, may be obligated to register a choice informed by their own 
subjective moral assessment of a constitutional conflict that is neither 
avoidable nor amenable to negotiation.  Such instances need not, however, 
so eclipse the more frequent, constructive efforts of constitutional courts in 
a pluralist democracy as to require them systematically to abjure the judicial 
review function, as total incorporation would have required in the Four-
teenth Amendment context or that the lockstep approach would demand of 
state supreme courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal constitutional law contains no doctrine that requires state 
courts to defer, absolutely or by way of a strong presumption, to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution when construing 
analogous state constitutional provisions to provide individual rights in ex-
cess of those recognized under federal law.  Aside from a few states that 
have adopted state constitutional amendments to require such state court 
deference,270 there is also no formal doctrine under state law that requires 
lockstepping or its variations.  Instead, the affirmative case for state court 
deference to prior federal interpretation must rest on prudential grounds, ar-
guments that such an approach is likely to produce better results all things 
considered. 
 In considering the arguments for state court deference to Supreme 
Court interpretation, the debate surrounding Justice Black’s call for total in-
corporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides a useful, if imperfect, analogy.  In both instances, proponents have 
sought to minimize opportunities for judicial decisionmaking, by requiring 
or encouraging courts to defer to the work of prior adjudicators (and, to tie 
the future development of constitutional meaning to a distinct body of case 
law). 
Both the call for total incorporation in the mid-twentieth century and 
the call for state court lockstepping more recently are subject to a realist ac-
count.  Some have argued that Justice Black, the chief proponent of the 
former, wished to lock in a set of policy commitments that had been negoti-
ated by the post-court-packing Supreme Court.271  Similarly, others have 
suggested that advocates for state court lockstepping were motivated by a 
wish to restrain the interpretive work of state supreme courts to the political 
left of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.272  There may be significant ex-
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planatory force in both of these accounts, although it is unlikely that either 
provides a complete explanation for the allure of these doctrines. 
In addition, the call for state courts to incorporate the interpretive work 
of prior adjudicators rests on practical arguments with respect to the need 
for uniformity and consistency in the development of constitutional law and 
on the greater maturity and experience of the U.S. Supreme Court in devel-
oping abstract constitutional language with respect to individual rights.273  
But these considerations of uniformity and consistency must be weighed 
against the advantages offered by constitutional redundancy of the sort de-
scribed years ago by Robert Cover and accomplished by state court deci-
sions that fill in the gaps created by the possibility of a federalism discount 
in some areas.274  And the advantages of jurisprudential maturity and expe-
rience that are claimed for federal constitutional doctrine likely are more 
than offset by the more specific knowledge and attention to local history 
and culture that state supreme courts can bring to their work.275 
Finally, total incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment context and 
state court lockstepping both share a motivating purpose, grounded in the 
conviction that constitutional adjudication is inherently corrosive of demo-
cratic self-governance, to transform constitutional courts into spectators.  
But the long history of practice in both the U.S. Supreme Court and in 
thoughtful state supreme courts demonstrates that these judicial actors can 
exercise interpretive agency in a fashion that dissolves, or at least amelio-
rates, these concerns.  The pragmatic, prudentialist vision offered by An-
thony Kronman, Cass Sunstein, and others provides a framework for ad-
dressing open-textured individual rights provisions in state constitutions 
that is close to the framework suggested by Justices Harlan and Frankfurter 
in response to Justice Black’s concerns about the Court’s development of 
the Due Process Clause.  It is also an intellectual heir to the commentary of 
Sanford Kadish and others from the mid-twentieth century.276  This vision 
conceives of constitutional courts as conveners, capable of drawing into a 
broad constitutional conversation the multiple institutional stakeholders en-
titled to contribute to the development of constitutional norms; as articula-
tors of the longstanding normative commitments that a political community 
has embedded over the course of its history; and as guides assisting the var-
ious components of that community to make their way along a developing 
moral trajectory.  The work of the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. 
Santiago and the cases leading up to it provides but one example of the 
promise of state judicial actors in this regard.  State supreme courts need 
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not surrender agency by systematically deferring to the interpretation of a 
prior federal adjudicator in order to safeguard the state’s interests in demo-
cratic governance.  Exercised with prudence and with pragmatic concern for 
the interests of corresponding state institutional actors, the practice of state 
constitutional judicial review can be accomplished responsibly, even when 
it results in the interpretation of a state constitution that departs meaningful-
ly from an established interpretation of federal constitutional law. 
